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LAND USE REGULATION AND GOOD INTENTIONS 
STEVEN J. EAGLE* 
This Essay surveys contemporary issues in American land 
use regulation. Its central claim is that, despite good intentions, 
regulations often have either been ineffective or exacerbated 
existing problems. The problems underlying regulation include 
contested understandings of private property rights, continual 
economic and social change, and a political process prone to ad 
hoc deal making. Together, they result in regulation that is 
conceptually incoherent and continually provisional. 
The Essay briefly reviews how land use philosophy has 
changed from early nuisance prevention, through Progressive 
Era comprehensive planning, to modern views of regulation as 
transactional. It examines our regulatory takings framework for 
delineating between private property rights and legitimate 
government regulation. The Essay reviews such contentious 
issues as affordable housing. Finally, it asserts that, in the 
absence of a generally agreed upon understanding of land use 
goals, comprehensive grand bargains among factions and 
public-private partnerships would facilitate entrenchment and 
favoritism. The ensuing uncertainty and lack of housing 
opportunities in cities where workers would be most productive 
harms individual advancement and the national economy. 
Keywords 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay broadly considers contemporary issues in 
American land use regulation. Its central claim is that, despite 
good intentions, regulations often have either been ineffective 
or exacerbated existing problems. This state of affairs results 
from contested understandings regarding the meaning and 
importance of private property rights, economic and social 
dynamism, and a political process prone to producing general 
aspirational statements and ad hoc dealmaking. Together, they 
result in regulation that is conceptually incoherent and 
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continually provisional. This leads to uncertainty, which 
undermines financial and social investment in communities. 
As an initial illustration, Americans desire to live in 
communities with great economic prosperity, fine natural and 
manmade amenities, and low housing prices. Alas, on this vale 
of tears any two of those desirable things are available, but not 
all three. A common response has been for various interest 
groups to declare the states of affairs that they hope to achieve, 
and sheath them in terms that others would seem to be 
churlish to oppose, such as "affordable housing."1 
The Essay briefly reviews how land use philosophy has 
changed from early nuisance prevention, through Progressive 
Era comprehensive planning, to modern views of regulation as 
transactional. It also examines our legal framework for 
delineating the boundary between private property rights and 
legitimate government regulation. Finally, it asserts that, in 
the absence of a generally agreed upon understanding of land 
use goals, suggestions for comprehensive grand bargains 
among factions and public-private partnerships would facilitate 
entrenchment and favoritism. 
IL PROPERTY IN AMERICA 
The extent to which property should be regulated by the 
State is predicated upon 'Yhether "property" primarily serves 
as a shield to protect individual autonomy, for which the 
accumulation of property protects against dependence on 
government, as well as enhancing many nonpecuniary values. 2 
From this perspective, property is a prepolitical right, which 
government does not create, but rather protects. 3 
In contrast, Progressive Property focuses on property as 
entailing responsibilities to society. Professor Gregory 
Alexander, thus, refers to "governance property" as a construct 
where fragmentary and coincident rights to possess, use, and 
transfer assets require the creation of norms to govern 
1. See infra Part IV for discussion of affordable housing issues. 
2. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, The Symbiosis of Pride & Property 
(Jan. 17, 2017) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2891716) (noting that authentic 
pride is evolutionarily useful, and may manifest itself through property ownership). 
3. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1568 (2003). "Property is a 'natural'-inherent, prepolitical, and 
prelegal-right because its pursuit secures a wide range of natural goods [, such as] 
self-preservation, the preservation of one's family, and the wealth needed to practice 
other virtues that require some minimum of material support." Id. 
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relations among interest holders. 4 "The moral foundation of 
governance property is human flourishing. This pluralistic 
conception of human flourishing means that property serves 
multiple values and that these values are incommensurable."5 
A. The Lockean Tradition and Property Rights 
After the English Glorious Revolution of 1688, the "new 
understanding" was that "ultimate political authority derived 
not from the divine right of kings, but from the consent of the 
governed."6 English and Scottish Enlightenment authors were 
closely associated with the Glorious Revolution, and the best 
known of these to eighteenth-century Americans was John 
Locke, whose Second Treatise of Government declaimed, "lives, 
liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, 
property." 7 
"By the late eighteenth century, 'Lockean' ideas on 
government and revolution were accepted everywhere in 
America; they seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built 
into English constitutional tradition."8 The prepolitical nature 
of property rights9 was reflected in the Preamble of the 
Virginia Constitution, which was drafted by George Mason and 
adopted on June 12, 1776. It declared, "All men are born 
equally free and independent and have certain inherent and 
natural rights ... among which are the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, 
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."10 The right 
to private property was presupposed in the Fifth Amendment 
4. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PAL. REV. 1853, 1856 
(2012). 
5. Id. at 1876-77 (internal citations omitted) (citing as pluralistic values 
"personal autonomy, individual security, self-development or self-realization, social 
welfare, community and sharing, fairness, friendship, and love."). 
6. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1431 
(1987). 
7. JOHN LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §123, at 204 (Peter 
Laslett ed., New York: New American Library 1965) (1690). 
8. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 87 (Vintage Books 1st ed. 1997). 
9. See generally, Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of 
Property, 26 V AL.U. L. REV. 367 (1991); See also, Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and 
Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017) (focusing on the connection 
between human labor and flourishing). 
10. PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, June 12, 1776, as reprinted in MAIER, supra note 8, 
at 126-27. 
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of the United States (U.S.) Constitution, 11 and memorably was 
described by Professor James Ely as the "guardian of every 
other right." 12 
B. Progressive Property and Societal Constraints 
In contrast with the Framers' Lockean orientation, the 
noted historian Gordon Wood wrote that the revolutionary 
American form of Civic Republicanism "meant ... more than 
eliminating a king and instituting an elective system of 
government; it meant setting forth moral and social goals as 
well. Republics required a particular sort of independent, 
egalitarian, and virtuous people .... "13 
A contemporary manifestation of Civic Republicanism is 
progressive property, 14 particularly in its emphasis that 
property ownership entails owners' responsibility. 15 Professor 
Alexander emphasized that we should reject that property is a 
''black box" from which owners deal with outside non-owners 
and focus instead on the "internal life" of property; that is to 
say, the relationship among its stakeholders. 16 
Together with Professors Eduardo Penalver, Joseph 
Singer, and Laura Underkuffler, Alexander issued a short 
manifesto entitled A Statement of Progressive Property, 17 which 
suggested, among other things, that property "implicates plural 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
12. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008). 
13. Robert W. Bennett, 0/ Gnarled Pegs and Round Holes: Sunstein's Civic 
Republicanism and the American Constitution, ll CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 395 
(1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)) (quoting 
Gordon S. Wood, Republicanism, in Leonard W. Levy, ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 448, 449 (Supp I, MacMillan, 1992)). 
14. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property As Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667 
(1998). 
Attacking legally-created privileges as un-American was established as a 
common theme in political-legal tracts in the revolutionary era, and it 
continued to be prominent well into the nineteenth century, especially among 
Jacksonians. The Jacksonian interpretation of republicanism emphasized its 
democratic possibilities, in contrast with the Federalist-Whig interpretation, 
which stressed its belief in social hierarchy and political order. 
Id. at 682. 
15. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property 
Law, 94 CORNELLL. REV. 745, 747-48 (2009). 
16. Alexander, supra note 4, at 1854-55. 
17. Gregory S. Alexander, et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 7 43 (2009). 
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and incommensurable values," including individual wants and 
needs, environmental stewardship and civic responsibility, and 
human dignity.18 
Professor Lee Anne Fennell has challenged what she 
termed the "fee simple obsolete," which "most plainly gets in 
the way" of better reconfiguration and coordination of property 
rights.19 She asserted that reliance on the fee simple as the 
predominant ownership vehicle made sense when "temporal 
spillovers loom large, interdependence among parcels is low, 
most value is produced within the four corners of the property, 
and cross-boundary externalities come in forms that 
governance strategies can readily reach."20 Now, however, the 
fee simple's "rootedness" and "endlessness" augur for new ways 
to reconfigure urban land. 21 
III. THE TRADITION AND LAW OF LAND USE PLANNING 
A. Planning and Common Law Nuisance 
Since its colonial beginnings "land use planning" has grown 
from modest regulations akin to protection from common law 
nuisance to expert plans attempting to fine-tune the use of 
individual parcels for the benefit of society. 
A study of Los Angeles, for instance, noted that regulations 
began in 1573, when laws promulgated by Philip II of Spain, 
"included detailed instructions for the location of 'slaughter 
houses, fisheries, tanneries, and other businesses which 
produce filth."' 22 In nineteenth-century America, the location of 
livery stables was an important urban concern.23 In modern 
times, zoning regulation attenuates such concerns, but does not 
eliminate them.24 
"Dirty industrial activities in the middle of residential 
communities and unsightly and aesthetically offensive 
developments such as tanneries and slaughterhouses 
18. Id. at 743. 
19. Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1464 (2016). 
20. Id. at 1457. 
21. Id. at 1489-90. 
22. James M. Anderson, et al., Reducing Crime by Shaping the Built 
Environment with Zoning: An Empirical Study of Los Angeles, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 
709-10 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
23. E.g., City of Chicago v. Stratton, 44 N.E. 853 (Ill. 1896) (upholding ordinance 
requiring that neighbors consent to the siting of a livery stable in a residential block). 
24. See, e.g., OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER ON THE URBAN 
SPRAWL DEBATE 16 (2002) ("If you invest in building a house, you don't know for sure 
that a tannery or a pulp mill won't get built next door someday."). 
\ 
) 
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depressed the values of adjacent business and residential 
properties."25 There are scholars who have emphasized that 
colonial experience included broader land use controls, most 
notably Professor John Hart.26 Historical experience was the 
subject of an exchange in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council27 between Justice Antonin Scalia, who alluded to the 
apparently Lockean "historical compact recorded in the 
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional 
culture,"28 and Justice Harry Blackmun, who countered that 
"[i]t is not clear from the Court's opinion where our 'historical 
compact' or 'citizens' understanding' comes from, but it does not 
appear to be history."29 
Reflecting the owners' affirmative rights of use in 
common and natural law, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court 
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 30 declared that 
"the right to build on one's own property-even though 
its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting 
requirements~annot remotely be described as a 
'government benefit."'31 In recently quoting this language in 
Horne v. Department of Agriculture,32 the Court made clear 
that the Fifth Amendment's protection against uncompensated 
takings is as applicable to personal property as to real 
property. 33 
Public nuisance was closely associated with modern 
comprehensive land use regulation from the beginning. In the 
seminal case upholding zoning, Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co.,34 the Supreme Court noted that, "[i]n solving 
doubts, the maxim 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,' which 
lies at the foundation of so much of the common l[a]w of 
25. Barbara Clark, An Expanded Role for the State in Regional Land Use 
Control, 70 CAL. L. REV. 151, 177 n.14 (1982). 
26. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern 
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996) (asserting greater regulation than 
now generally assumed). 
27. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
28. Id. at 1028. 
29. Id. at 1055--56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
30. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
31. Id. at 835 n.2. 
32. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
33. Id. at 2430--31 (distinguishing Ruckelshaus u. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 
(1984). In Monsanto, the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets was upheld, because the 
case involved "dangerous chemicals," whereas the raisins at issue in Horne were a 
"healthy snack." Id. 
34. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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nuisance, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew."35 More 
recently, in Lucas,36 the Court declared, with reference to 
"regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of 
land," that "[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly 
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere 
in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles 
of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon 
land ownership."37 However, Justice Scalia's attempt in Lucas 
to devise a bright line rule was not successful, and, perhaps 
confounding his expectations, the principal role of the case 
has been to fortify municipalities' argument that stringent 
regulations are based on background principles.38 
B. The Rise of Comprehensive Planning 
While public land use planning in America has some earlier 
antecedents, 39 modern planning regulation began with 
New York City's comprehensive ordinance in 1916.40 The 
Department of Commerce promulgated its model Standard 
Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) in 1928.41 The Act was extremely 
successful and serves as a basis for state enabling laws in all 
50 states.42 Section 3 of SZEA required that zoning ordinances 
be drafted "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."43 In a 
landmark article, 44 Professor Charles Haar discussed that the 
"comprehensive plan" requirement appeared to be a "directive 
to put zoning on a base broader than and beyond itself .... "45 
35. Id. at 387 (stating the maxim "the use of one's property should be limited so 
as not to injure that of another"). 
36. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
37. Id. at 1029. 
38. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of 
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 
(2005). 
39. See generally JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND 
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW (3d ed. 2013). 
40. Id. at 41. 
41. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE 
ZONING ENABLING ACT, S. Doc. No. 13-29 (1926) [hereinafter SZEA], https://planning-
orguploadedmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/legacy_resources/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnabling 
Act1926.pdf. 
42. See Gary D. Taylor & Mark A. Wyckoff, Intergovernmental Zoning Conflicts 
Over Public Facilities Siting: A Model Framework for Standard State Acts, 41 URB. 
LAW. 653, 683 (2009). 
43. SZEA, supra note 41, § 3, at 6-7. Under §3 of the Standard Act, zoning was 
required to be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." 
44. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. 
REV. 1154 (1955). 
45. Id. at 1156. 
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Given that the comprehensive plan was the vehicle that 
associated the police power of the State with the details of 
local regulations, Haar subsequently referred to it as the 
"impermanent constitution" against which courts would 
measure disputed regulations. 46 
"A nuisance," Justice George Sutherland declared in 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,47 "may be merely a right thing in 
the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard."48 Thus, zoning was, at least in large measure, an 
attempt to assign incompatible land uses to different 
geographical areas. 
Professor Haar stressed that "by [the comprehensive plan's] 
requirement of information gathering and analysis, controls 
are based on facts, not haphazard surmises-hence their moral 
and consequent legal basis; by its comprehensiveness, 
diminished are the problems of discrimination, granting of 
special privileges, and the denial of equal protection of the 
laws."49 Another important proponent of the importance of the 
comprehensive plan was Professor Daniel Mandelker, who 
detailed why and how it should be implemented.50 
State courts have interpreted the comprehensive planning 
requirement in different ways. A few continue to state that the 
comprehensive plan is to be found in the zoning ordinances and 
maps; the trend has been that the existence of a separate plan 
is at least a factor in judicial deference to zoning regulations, 
and in a few states there is a mandate for a separate 
comprehensive plan.51 All of this recently led Professor 
Mandelker to note that in recent decades courts have 
considered spot zoning cases using "nebulous rules applied on 
an erratic basis."52 ''Wealth transfer and capture by developer 
or neighbor interests can occur," he added, and multifactor 
tests generally have been "not helpful."53 Reiterating his earlier 
46. Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 353, 365--66 (1955). 
47. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
48. Id. at 388. 
49. Harr, supra note 46, at 365--66. 
50. See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan 
in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L.REV. 899 (1976). 
51. See Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer Bragar, Recent Developments in 
Comprehensive Planning, 46 URB. LAW. 685, 687-97 (2014). 
52. Daniel R. Mandelker, Spot Zoning: New Ideas for an Old Problem 48 URB. 
LAW. 737, 782-83 (2016). 
53. Id. at 782. 
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view, Mandelker concluded: "Consistency with a comprehensive 
plan, as the only test for spot zoning, addresses these 
concerns."54 
1. Expert Decision Makers in the Progressive Tradition 
The rise of comprehensive zoning very much is part of the 
broader story of the Progressive Era in which professionalism 
came of age. 55 Professionalism "thrived in a time in which 
science and expertise occupied an exalted position in the 
collective imagination," and in which "government and society 
in general turned to the well-trained expert to help 
preserve fairness, justice, and progress in an increasingly 
complex industrial world."56 Professor Michael Allen Wolf 
described zoning as a "quintessential Progressive concept," 
because it relied on experts to design and enforce regulations 
that would create a more pleasant environment that, in turn, 
would "foster healthy, responsible citizens[.]"57 
Notably, Professor Bruce Ackerman wrote 40 years ago of 
"Scientific Policymakers" who would apply expert regulation in 
allocating rights in things among claimants,58 as opposed to 
addressing the ownership of things from a more foundational 
and holistic perspective. 59 This was part and parcel of 
Ackerman's more general view of the Progressive Era, which 
applauded the "independent and expert administrative agency 
creatively regulating a complex social problem in the public 
interest."60 
Ackerman's assertions might be viewed as a high-water 
mark of faith in expertise. The subsequent decline in the 
54. Id. at 783. 
55. See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS 
TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS, 484-85 (1961). 
56. Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 649, 
650 (2016). 
57. MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER 30 
(2008). 
58. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1977). 
59. See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 
SEA'ITLE U. L. REV. 617, 619-20 (2009). 
60. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HAsSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, OR 
How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-
SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 1 (1981) ("The rise of 
environmental consciousness in the late 1960s coincided with the decline of an older 
dream the image of an independent and expert administrative agency creatively 
regulating a complex social problem in the public interest."). 
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concept of professionalism, 61 and distrust of authority, are 
reflected in the recent cultural awareness of the pervasiveness 
of "alternative facts" and the concept of a "post truth" society. 62 
A more immediately relevant problem is that planners 
themselves have lost their belief in long-term planning, and 
thus their work now focuses on the shorter-term.63 The 
tendency to focus planning on "how a community might appear 
on a specific date far in the future" seemed to crest before 1980, 
when "virtually all planning professionals had come to 
recognize both the limits of rationality and the unpredictability 
of modern civilization .... [F]lexible, middle-range planning 
has come to replace long-range, end-state planning."64 This 
seems sensible, given that "one thing that is certain about 
planning for the future is that the future is uncertain, whether 
because of unforeseen shifts in demographics, technological 
advancements, natural disasters, or other unpredictable 
events."65 While this turn has made planning more flexible and 
pragmatic, it has reduced the stability that encourages 
development and lends doubt to regulatory decisions.66 
Shorter time horizons do not necessarily change planners' 
normative perspectives. In 1963, one senior planner wrote that 
his colleagues regarded low-density development as "inherently 
evil," that they "assumeO that the city must have a high-
density core," and that most "express a greater preference for 
row houses, garden apartments, and elevator apartments than 
for single-family houses."67 Similarly, "[i]n the early 1990s, 
land use planners turned to the concept of 'smart growth' to 
help control the impacts of urban sprawl."68 
61. Roiphe, supra note 56, at 650 ("Professionalism was a casualty of the 1970s. 
It was lost in the shuffle as the culture shifted from one that emphasized the 
importance of the social and the value of a carefully coordinated national community to 
one that focused on the power of the individual and smaller more parochial groups."). 
62. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting 
the Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137-38 (2017). [However], "social 
scientists from a variety of fields, most notably political science and psychology, have 
long been interested in how and why individuals and institutions adopt behaviors or 
beliefs that are patently at odds with observable reality." Id. 
63. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
69--70 (4th ed. 2013). 
64. Id. 
65. Richard K. Norton, Who Decides, How, and Why? Planning for the Judicial 
Review of Local Legislative Zoning Decisions, 43 URB. LAW. 1085, 1090 (2011) 
66. Id. 
67. William L.C. Wheaton, Operations Research for Metropolitan Planning, 29 J. 
AM. INST. PLANNERS 250, 254-55 (1963), http:/ldx.doi.org/10.1080/01944366308978074. 
68. Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, the City, and Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. REV. 145, 177 
(2002). 
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While the strong policy preferences of many planners 
might yield to a pragmatic, short-term application of planning 
principles, they might be susceptible to weariness, or even 
cynicism. Professor Carol Rose has noted: 
Land use issues might to some degree be regarded as 
specialized matters, but on closer examination their 
specialized quality evaporates. It is true that local 
governments are advised by planning commissions, but 
the commissioners are normally ordinary citizens with 
no special expertise. Planning commission advisory 
staffs are professionals, but even professional planners 
have come to see their tasks as more political than 
technical. 69 
2. Regulation Expands Beyond Nuisance-Like Activity 
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Euclid was that zoning 
could be viewed as a prophylactic, such as for prevention of 
contagious disease, as opposed to literal nuisance regulation. 70 
Many subsequent cases have gone further, however, and have 
used zoning to fine tune the municipal tax base,71 or the 
socioeconomic composition of neighborhoods. 72 
Low-density land use often is pejoratively labeled as 
"sprawl," and higher-density uses often are labeled as "smart 
growth." Dean Janice Griffith encapsulated that view: 
Many people in the United States prefer living in a 
rural environment with low density. They will keep 
moving farther and farther out from the central city 
when further development engulfs their suburban 
69. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls As Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 868--69 (1983). 
70. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926). "[T]he law 
of nuisance[s] ... may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the 
helpful aid of its analogies" as to "excludeO from residential sections ... structures 
likely to create nuisances." Id. (emphasis added). 
71. See, e.g., 99 Cents Stores Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129--30 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed by 60 F. App'x 123 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding pretextual condemnation to augment municipal tax revenue); 
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 
1209 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (involving church parcel condemned for re-transfer to a big box 
store that would generate sales taxes). 
72. See, e.g., Chinese Staff and Workers Ass'n v. Bloomberg, 26 Misc. 3d 979, 980 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that the State Environmental Quality Review Act 
necessitated a "hard look at the socioeconomic impact" of a proposed luxury high-rise in 
a socioeconomically diverse neighborhood). 
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residences. North Americans value independence and 
freedom from public regulation. Before they are willing 
to adopt more compact living, they must come to believe 
that the benefits of smart growth outweigh the 
detriments of sprawl. Greater density living will not be 
palatable until the harms caused by sprawl-congested 
highways, air pollution, diminished water quality, and 
loss of open space-are viewed as unsolvable without the 
use of more smart growth techniques. Thus, even if 
planners and lawyers draw up a perfect smart growth 
code, political pressures may prevent its adoption or 
compromise its administration once adopted.73 
99 
At the same time as he apparently condescended in opmmg 
"even the most unenlightened realize [that sprawl] needs 
rethinking," Robert Burchell nevertheless described the fruits 
of low-density development in what most Americans would 
regard as almost rhapsodic terms.74 
IV. FROM TRADITIONAL PLANNING TO "ZONING FOR DOLLARS" 
A. Is Planning "Social Engineering"? 
For better or worse, the past century of American land use 
planning has been marked by "social engineering,"75 a phrase 
often used as a pejorative connoting overly-intrusive or 
unnecessary regulation. 76 The results often are mixed. The 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), for instance, has been 
"one of the most important U.S. housing policy institutions of 
73. Janice C. Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth: The Need for 
Regional Governments, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (2001). 
74. Robert W. Burchell, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United States, 
5 HAsTING W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 159-60 (1999). ''It provides safe and 
economically heterogeneous neighborhoods that are removed from the problems of the 
central city. In low-density, middle-class environments, life is lived with relative ease, 
and when residents wish to relocate, they typically leave in better financial condition-
the result of housing appreciation." Id. at 160. 
75. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1635 (2003). "Euclid is now understood, in one leading 
casebook's characterization, 'as a generous endorsement of social engineering in the 
name of public health, safety, and welfare."' Id. (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) and quoting JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, 
PROPERTY 1010 (5th ed. 2002)). 
76. See, e.g., Harry W. Richardson & Peter Gordon, The Implications of the 
Breaking the Logjam Project for Smart Growth and Urban Land Use, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 529, 543 (2008) (describing as "stunning" the notion that changes in land use 
regulation can remedy the obesity problem). 
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the 20th and 21st centuries,"77 although for much of its history 
it affirmatively furthered racial segregation.78 Likewise, the 
Interstate Highway System was the major impetus to 
suburbanization and all it entails. 79 
Claims of social engineering have arisen recently as a result 
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
promulgation in 2015 of its final rule on "Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing," that establishes the predicate for 
much stricter federal enforcement of fair housing laws.80 Two 
weeks earlier, the Supreme Court made it easier to establish 
violations of the Fair Housing Act81 in Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project. 82 At that time, Dr. Ben Carson, now Secretary of HUD, 
castigated the regulation as social engineering, asserting that 
"government-engineered attempts to legislate racial equality 
create consequences that often make matters worse. . . . 
[B]ased on the history of failed socialist experiments in this 
country, entrusting the government to get it right can prove 
downright dangerous."83 
B. Markets and Land Regulation 
In The Problem of Social Cost,84 Ronald Coase 
demonstrated that in a world without transaction costs the 
initial assignment of property rights would not matter, since 
rights easily could be acquired and recombined by the person 
placing the highest value upon them.85 His conclusion 
77. James H. Carr, The Complex History of the Federal Housing Administration: 
Building Wealth, Promoting Segregation, and Rescuing the U.S. Housing Market and 
the Economy, 34 BANKING & FIN. SERVS POL 'y REP. 10, 10 (Aug. 2015) (noting that the 
FHA issued the first government-guaranteed mortgages in the U.S., which were "a 
major contributor to both the post-World War II housing boom, particularly in the 
suburbs, and accelerated home ownership" (internal citations omitted)). 
78. See infra notes 297-299 and accompanying text. 
79. See ARTHUR C. NELSON & JAMES B. DUNCAN, GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 2-5 (1995) (noting that the system opened huge areas of 
rural land to development). 
80. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) 
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 92, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). See also Steven J. Eagle, 
''Affordable Housing" as Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L. J., 1, 27 (2017). 
81. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601--06 (2012). 
82. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015) (upholding the use of "disparate impact" as a test 
for determining if local housing regulations or actions violate the Fair Housing Act). 
83. Ben S. Carson, Experimenting With Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES, 
July 23, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-
housingrules-try-to-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/KJ3C-49QT]. 
84. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
85. See id. at 2--8. 
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depended upon the crucial assumptions that property rights 
were fully specified, and also that the cost of determining the 
existing ownership of rights and negotiating, contracting for, 
and monitoring their assignment was zero. 86 
A key insight of The Problem of Social Cost was that 
untoward results often result from the propinquity of land uses 
that are separately desirable, but also incompatible, and that 
each might be seen as inflicting harm (negative externalities) 
upon the other.87 Professor David Spence observed that, in this 
Coasean framework, the "most efficient solution to externality 
problems is not regulation but a compensation agreement 
produced by private bargaining among the affected parties."88 
As noted earlier,89 the judicial imprimatur for 
comprehensive zoning in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.90 was, at 
least in large measure, an attempt to assign incompatible land 
uses to different geographical areas. However, zoning on a 
citywide scale is by its nature too coarse-grained to take into 
account preferable uses of individual parcels of land. Thus, 
Professor Robert Nelson argued that zoning should be treated 
as collective rights of residents of individual neighborhoods.91 
He,92 and also Professor William Fischel,93 advocated that 
private bargaining could more efficiently achieve goals 
embodied in zoning. In City Unplanning, 94 Professor David 
Schleicher observed that "[t]he idea that a government planner 
should decide the best uses for private real property may seem 
like an odd economic theory, but it has a basis in the economics 
of property law."95 He restated Nelson and Fischel's basic 
proposition: 
86. Id. at 15. Coase was building an economic model, and realized that a world of 
zero transactions costs was fanciful. Indeed, in such a world reallocations of resources 
would take place instantaneously. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE 
LAW 14-15 (1988). 
87. Coase, supra note 84, at 2. 
88. David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 
413 n.187 (2014). 
89. See supra note 47-48 and accompanying text. 
90. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
91. See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace 
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 827, 834 (1999). 
92. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 39-511 (1977). 
93. See e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY 
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 72-149 (1985). 
94. David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013). 
95. Id. at 1681. 
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If landowners have an absolute right to build, and a 
landowner wants to build something that has a negative 
effect on her neighbors, the transaction costs and 
collective action problems of getting all the neighbors 
together to pay the property holder not to build (or to 
build less) would be prohibitive. If, on the other hand, 
local governments, representing the interests of 
property holders in a city, have the ability to deny a 
landowner the right to build for any reason, the 
potential developer can simply pay the city for the right 
to build. The assignment of the right should not matter 
if transaction costs are low, as Coasean bargaining 
between the developer and the city should ensure that 
we get to the optimal amount of development. 96 
As Schleicher noted, some problems with this approach are 
that local officials represent what Fischel calls their 
"homevoter" constituents, who are concerned with the value of 
their homes.97 Thus, these constituents try to raise property 
values through restricting the supply of homes,98 and also try 
to avoid responsibility for paying taxes for the poor.99 
From the perspective of private property rights, Schleicher's 
summary elides over two fundamental problems. First, 
transactional purchasers of rights pertaining to land are 
unwilling to pay for the subjective value placed on those rights 
by previous owners. In consensual transactions, those losses of 
idiosyncratic value are inframarginal, since the prior holders 
nevertheless are willing to sell. 100 However, that is not the case 
when government appropriates property through eminent 
domain, since the measure of compensation is only the 
objective "fair market" value. 101 That led Judge Richard Posner 
96. Id.at 1682 (internal citation omitted). 
97. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LoCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLITICS 
(2001). 
98. Schleicher, supra note 94, at 1684 (2013) (citing inter alia, Robert C. 
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 
385, 400 (1977)). 
99. Id. 
100. See James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 
ECONOMICA 371 (1962) (describing as irrelevant, changes that do not actually affect 
decision making). 
101. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25--26 (1984) ("The Fifth 
Amendment requires that the United States pay 'just compensation'-normally 
measured by fair market value-whenever it takes private property for public use.") 
(citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374, (1943) ("what a willing buyer would 
pay in cash to a willing seller")). 
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to observe that "[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense 
is ... not full compensation."102 
Second, if local government "represent[s] the interests of 
property holders in a city,"103 the concept of representation 
apparently is based on one of two meanings. In the parens 
patriae sense, it refers to the police power of the state to protect 
its citizens, which is quite distinct from the takings power. 
From the other perspective, where the state is deemed to be the 
transactional agent of its citizens, the implicit suggestion is 
either that property owners in a city have identical interests 
with respect to local land use actions that affect some much 
more than others, which is at best an overstatement, or that 
local government otherwise will ensure that things even out 
through the concept of reciprocity of advantage. The phrase 
"average reciprocity of advantage" was famously used by 
Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 104 to refer to 
the kind of implicit, in-kind compensation that might occur, for 
instance, when the benefit derived from neighbors being 
subject to a restriction at least offsets the loss that the 
restriction inflicts on any given property owner. 105 
Reciprocity of advantage is the basis for detailed private 
restrictions issued by homeowners' associations, and some 
commonplace public regulations, such as those requiring wide 
setbacks from the street for all houses on a boulevard.106 The 
concept also is applicable within some well-defined districts, 
such as preservation of building facades within the French 
Quarter of New Orleans. 107 But the doctrine is inherently 
problematic where the unusual and valuable assets possessed 
by a few are restricted for the benefit of the many. A classic 
instance occurred in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, 108 which upheld the landmarking of some 400 
buildings in New York City, including Grand Central Terminal, 
102. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). 
103. Schleicher, supra note 94, at 1682. 
104. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
105. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 195-215 (1985). 
106. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of Nature Theory, and 
Environmental Protection, 4 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 30-31 (2009) (noting that height 
and setback restrictions can secure average reciprocity of advantage, thereby leaving 
"[a]ll group members ... better off," with the regulation "overcom[ing] transactional 
obstacles that prevent cooperation"). 
107. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
108. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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to benefit the City's millions of residents. Then-Justice William 
Rehnquist filed a vehement dissent invoking that tremendous 
disparity .109 
Agglomeration was suggested by Professor Schleicher as 
the deus ex machina to deal with the problem of non-reciprocal 
reciprocity.no Through agglomeration, as Alfred Marshall 
observed nearly a century ago, workers skilled in a specialized 
trade gather where there are many potential employers, firms 
specialized in that industry gather where there are many 
suitable employees, and the "mysteries of the trade" are 
explicated and advanced through informal conversation 
everywhere.ll1 As economist Robert Lucas memorably 
explained: "What can people be paying Manhattan or 
downtown Chicago rents for, if not for being near other 
people?"112 
But if agglomeration increases the size of the pie of urban 
prosperity, it does not give the local government ownership of 
its slices. While Schleicher states that cities do redistribute 
income, "largely because of the existence of agglomeration 
economics,"ll3 that does not confront the reciprocity problem. 
Perhaps, as the Armstrong principle sought to invoke, "public 
burdens" should not be disproportionately concentrated on the 
few.n4 As Dr. Samuel Johnson observed three centuries ago 
"[r]eciprocity long has been recognized as a necessity ingredient 
in human relations."ll5 
109. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Where a relatively few individual 
buildings, all separated from one another, are singled out and treated differently from 
surrounding buildings, no such reciprocity exists. The cost to the property owner which 
results from the imposition of restrictions applicable only to his property and not that 
of his neighbors may be substantial-in this case-several million dollars-with no 
comparable reciprocal benefits."). 
110. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economics Subject, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1507, 1515-29 (2010) (providing an overview of agglomeration economics). 
111. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 156 (8th Ed. 1890). Other 
leading works on agglomeration include: EDWARD GLAESER, TRlUMPH OF THE CITY: 
How OUR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES Us RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, 
AND HAPPIER 186 (2011); EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING 
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: How TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 58 
(2008). 
112. Schleicher, supra note 94, at 1687 (quoting Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the 
Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 39 (1988)). 
113. Id. at 1684 n.37 (citing CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LoCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND 
LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 72-105 (2011)). 
114. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (quoted in Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 125, 133-34 (1978)). 
115. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 245 (London: 1830) 
(letter to James Boswell, ca. March 15, 1774) ("Life cannot subsist in society but by 
reciprocal concessions."). 
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If common-law ownership includes rights to reasonable 
development, then agglomeration does not make the takings 
issue superfluous. If agglomeration has the effect of making a 
community more prosperous, it could increase taxes, but the 
imposition of taxes must not be conflated with the arrogation of 
property rights. The Supreme Court recently observed that "[i]t 
is beyond dispute that '[t]axes and user fees ... are not 
"takings.""'116 
Without formal theorizing, Chief Judge Breitel of the New 
York Court of Appeals built upon the premise that property 
rights are more valuable if the property is located within a 
thriving community. In that court's opinion in Penn Central, 117 
he stated: 
[T]he extent to which government, when regulating 
private property, must assure what is described as a 
reasonable return on that ingredient of property value 
created not so much by the efforts of the property owner, 
but instead by the accumulated indirect social and 
direct governmental investment in the physical property, 
its functions, and its surroundings. us 
Under Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning, as Professor Fischel 
noted, government is "entitled to appropriate to itself all of the 
advantages of civilization."119 
C. Zoning for Dollars 
The movement away from long-term comprehensive 
planning and Euclidean zoning, where designated uses are 
permissible "as of right,"120 has given rise to a number of 
schemes to facilitate land use planning and bargaining. 121 
116. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600-01 (2013) 
(quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, at 243, n. 2 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
117. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), 
atf'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
118. Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added). 
119. WILLIAM A. FlSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 
50 (1995). For additional discussion of this point, see Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the 
Dirigiste Tradition, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1071 (2011). 
120. See Lee Anne Fennell, Eduardo M. Penalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 S. CT. 
REV. 287, 342 (2013) (noting that "[i]n the usual Euclidean zoning law," within 
individual land use zones, "certain uses are permitted as of right, certain uses are 
prohibited, and others are permitted with special approval, provided certain conditions 
are met"). 
121. See infra Part V.B. 
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To a large extent local governments have asserted the right 
to control development on individual parcels. They might do so 
through comprehensive zoning but, as previously noted, many 
cities have concluded instead that a parcel-by-parcel 
bargaining process would be superior. 122 The result is that 
contemporary land use planning typically proceeds in 
"piecemeal fashion ... [whereby] regulators have discretion to 
block a project or permit it to go forward, and they bargain 
with the landowner over the terms on which they will approve 
the project."123 
In his classic article Zoning for Dollars, 124 Jerold Kayden 
described "incentive zoning" as the process by which "cities 
grant private real estate developers the legal right to disregard 
zoning restrictions in return for their voluntary agreement to 
provide urban design features." 125 While developer-funded 
amenities are beguiling, the concept has two obvious problems. 
One is that the invitation to "disregard" existing zoning calls 
the planning enterprise into question. As Kayden put it, it 
"intrinsically delegitimizes the entire regulatory system."126 
The other problem is that the lack of a stable and objective 
baseline for as-of-right development invites the sale and 
purchase of the police power and also corruption.127 
Kayden tried to avoid those problems by asserting that 
developers are entitled to "first tier" zonmg "without 
obligation" and that "[g]overnment invents ex nihilo 
development rights above the first tier and offers them strictly 
in its discretion .... 128 However, government does not invent 
development rights ex nihilo-out of nothing. Those rights 
generally do not spring full-blown from the imagination of 
planners after the basic zoning is codified. Rather, they present 
a perhaps irresistible invitation to zoning authorities to 
122. See supra notes 84-96, and accompanying text. 
123. Fennell & Penalver, supra note 120, at 300. 
124. Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments 
on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 
(1991) (describing the growing use by municipalities of incentive zoning to fund various 
local needs and amenities). 
125. Id. at 3 (including as examples affordable housing and parks). 
126. Id. at 7. 
127. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-Private 
Transactions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 937, 985 n.56 (2009). 
128. Kayden, supra note 124, at 38. 
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downsize the first tier bundle with the expectation of selling 
the withheld rights to developers later. 129 
Local officials greatly influence the scope of development in 
many ways other than through zoning and permitting. For 
instance, they facilitate tax increment financing (TIF), which is 
the most widely used development tool in the country. 130 TIF 
projects are financed using bond financing subsidized by the 
federal government, and real estate taxes on the "incremental" 
value of the improved land is diverted from general local 
government to servicing the bond. 131"Scant public reporting of 
TIF expenditures and revenues, 'guided by the invisible hand 
of lobbyists, political action committees and campaign 
contributions,' does nothing to allay suspicions of favoritism 
and corruption."132 
As I have discussed elsewhere, "the execution of good public 
policy inherently is improvisational and opportunistic."133 
Unfortunately, this flexibility leaves officials with ample 
latitude to make off-the-record demands, benefitting the 
municipality, that are blunt and overbearing, 134 and perhaps 
inuring to their own benefit, as well. One example of the latter 
is the acquisition by a political leader of land adjacent to that 
upon which there soon would be built a desirable municipal 
improvement, a process that a Tammany chieftain referred to 
as "honest graft."135 There are many alternatives to corrupt 
politicians accepting cash payments. 136 
129. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 913, 927 (noting that "[this] argument is undoubtedly correct" with regard to 
transferable development rights (TDRs)). 
130. See generally Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Financing and 
the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 65 (2010). 
131. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That's Right for California 
Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 998-99 (2001) (illustrating how TIF diverts 
substantial funds from schools and county services). 
132. George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses 
and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427, 473 (2011) (quoting Ike 
Wilson, Study: Young Businesses Grow Faster, FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Apr. 30, 2009, 
http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/archives/display _detail.htm ?Story ID 
=96285). 
133. Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land Use Regulation, 54 
WASHBURNL.J. 1, 2 (2014). 
134. See infra Part IV. 
135. Eagle, supra note 133, at 6 (describing the activities of New York City's 
legendary leader of Tammany Hall, George Washington Plunkitt). 
136. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of 
Takings Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2010) ("[I]n most contexts, even 
thoroughly corrupt politicians will be unable to or unwilling to take undisguised cash 
payments. Rather, corrupt politicians will seek to get paid indirectly. The payments 
may take a variety of forms, such as campaign contributions, business contracts with 
associates of the politician, and so forth."). This example was quoted in Gregory M. 
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Local officials do not want to harm their communities or 
their personal standing as a result of failed development 
projects, and it is difficult for them to acquire the foundational 
knowledgeable for astute bargaining without the expert 
assistance of experienced developers, who are apt to want a 
piece of the action as a quid pro quo.137 As Professor George 
Lefcoe observed: "Politically connected developers confer 
informally with public officials about the possibility of striking 
a redevelopment deal long before the formal redevelopment 
process begins."138 
Well-connected local developers who have done successful 
projects in the past have a large advantage because they are 
known to be reliable and discreet. This opens the possibility of 
"crony capitalism," which has been defined in this context as 
the "tendency of ostensible public-sector regulatory authorities 
reaching out to help their 'friends' in the private sector."139 
While it might be viewed from an economics perspective simply 
as a type of special interest regulation "by forcing us to see the 
particular cronies involved in shady deals, an emphasis on 
crony capitalism may be politically more useful than the more 
standard analysis."140 
Finally, the "zoning for dollars" problem works two ways. 
State and local business development agencies might have to 
incentivize businesses to locate or remain in the area. This 
might involve provision of infrastructure or job training, but 
also could involve government condemnation of numerous 
small parcels, with the resulting "superparcel" made available 
for new commercial development.141 I have argued that, if such 
Stein, Reverse Exactions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. *l, *8 (forthcoming 2017) 
(https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933013 )(making counterpoint to assertion that dangers of 
corruption are low in the exactions context). 
137. See Eagle, supra note 119, at 1079. 
138. George Lefcoe, After Keio, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic 
Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and 
School Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 80 (2008). 
139. Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the 
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1583 (1999) (reporting on 
American crony capitalism, conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency). 
See also Shawn Boburg, How Kushner Funded a Luxury Tower, WASH. 
POST, June 1, 2017, http://wapo.st/2qGLDSz?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.66c57f8af25a 
(describing how Kushner consultants worked with New Jersey state officials to devise a 
map that connected the project location to an area including "some of the city's poorest 
and most crime-ridden neighborhoods" four miles away, while at the same time they 
excluded some wealthy neighborhoods only blocks away). 
140. Paul H. Rubin, Crony Capitalism, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 105, 106-07 (2015). 
141. Classic cases include Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 
(Mich. 2004) (upholding condemnation of entire ethnic neighborhood for construction of 
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practices are to occur, the former owners should have a 
realistic opportunity to acquire an equity stake in the resulting 
redevelopment. 142 
Notably, while government actions that discriminate 
against out-of-state firms run afoul of the "dormant Commerce 
Clause," the Supreme Court has not considered whether state 
incentives that operate in favor of out-of-state firms to relocate 
should be included.143 
D. Exactions and Regulatory Property 
1. The Pervasiveness of Exactions in Planning 
How might we best view the demand of a municipality that 
a landowner provide a quid pro quo as a condition for obtaining 
a development permit? Exactions might range from dedicating 
land within a large subdivision for a new elementary school or 
a turn lane at the entrance, through providing funds to expand 
off-site infrastructure serving the project, to contributing for 
uses such as distant job retraining centers with only the most 
attenuated connection to the proposed development. 144 As 
Professors Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo Penalver have 
described, American land use planning has been replete with 
"exactions creep."145 
The Supreme Court's analysis of exactions began with 
Nollan u. California Coastal Commission,146 where it required 
that an "essential nexus" exist between a legitimate state 
Cadillac assembly plant); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding 
condemnation for regional economic revitalization to constitute valid "public use"). 
142. See Steven J. Eagle, Assembling Land for Urban Redevelopment: The Case for 
Owner Participation, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: EMINENT DOMAIN AND REGULATORY 
TAKINGS RE-EXAMINED 7 (Bruce L. Benson ed., 2010). 
143. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998) (analyzing issues); Richard C. Schragger, Cities, 
Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1096 
(2008) (noting that "cities are apt to engage in behavior that might be too solicitous of 
mobile capital, by forcing current residents to subsidize the entry of new or preferred 
arrivals"). 
144. See Kayden, supra note 124, at 3 ("[C]ities grant private real estate 
developers the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for their voluntary 
agreement to provide urban design features such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and 
social facilities and services such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job 
training."). 
145. See Fennell & Penalver, supra note 120, at 342. 
146. 483 U.S. 835 (1987). 
110 JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 33.1 
interest and the "permit condition."147 Next, where such a 
nexus did exist in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 148 the Court held 
that requirement to be a predicate to more penetrating inquiry, 
in which the municipality would have to demonstrate that 
there was a "rough proportionality" between the required 
exaction and the impact of the proposed development, and that 
this be supported by an "individualized determination" as 
opposed to a more general study of the area. 149 
Most recently, in Koontz u. St. Johns River Water 
Management District, 150 the Court applied the Nollan-Dolan 
principle to cases where the landowner was given the 
alternative of providing cash instead of an interest in real 
property, and also where the landowner refused to submit to 
the permit conditions. Writing for the Court, Justice Samuel 
Alita stated that the Court had "little trouble" distinguishing 
between the alternative of paying money in lieu of submitting 
to an exaction of real property and, as the respondents had 
suggested the case involved, exerc1smg the "power of 
taxation."151 In response to the contention that there was no 
taking where the permit conditioned upon an exaction was 
declined by the landowner, the Court responded: 
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use 
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not 
because they take property but because they 
impermissibly burden the right not to have property 
taken without just compensation. As in other 
unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone 
refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of 
coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a 
governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable 
injury. 152 
Justice Alita further stated that government may not 
"engageO in 'out-and-out ... extortion"' by " ... leverag[ing] its 
legitimate interest in mitigation" of police power burdens 
147. Id. at 837 (holding that the Commission's statutory powers to protect the 
view of the ocean from the public highway in front of a home did not justify a demand 
for an public easement of way behind the home, along the shore). 
148. 512 U.S. 374, 376 (1994). 
149. Id. at 391. 
150. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
151. Id. at 2602. 
152. Id. at 2596. 
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caused by the proposed development."153 Nollan, Dolan, and 
Koontz all involved exaction demands "adjudicated" by agency 
administrators, rather than legislated by a city council. 
Notably, the Court has not yet extende·d Nollan-Dolan to 
legislative exactions, and Justice Thomas recently reiterated 
that he "continue[d] to doubt that 'the existence of a taking 
should turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for 
the taking."'154 Scholarly reaction to Koontz has been mixed, 
with some enthusiastically in favor, 155 some qualifying support 
to adjudicative exactions, 156 and some dismissing the idea that 
extortion plays a significant role in the exactions process. 157 
Professor Timothy Mulvaney has warned that scholars 
favoring a Progressive view of property should not be too quick 
to defend the adjudicative-legislative distinction, since 
conceding that legislative actions had greater legitimacy would 
have untoward effects. 158 First, "the argument to immunize 
legislative exactions from heightened scrutiny is necessarily 
imbued with a tacit criticism of administrative exactions," 
which might produce "spillover effects on the many eminent 
domain and regulatory takings situations that involve 
administrative acts unrelated to exactions."159 In addition, it 
might result in "a pronounced shift in land use policy toward 
broad, unbending legislative measures to avoid ... heightened 
scrutiny," which would preclude finer-grained administrative 
regulation would take into account "the personal, political, and 
economic identities of those persons or groups" affected by land 
use conflicts. 160 
153. Id. at 2595. 
154. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Parking Assn. of Ga., Inc. v. 
Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). 
155. See, e.g., Christina M. Martin, Nollan and Dolan and Koontz-Oh My! The 
Exactions Trilogy Requires Developers to Cover the Full Social Costs of Their Projects, 
but No More, 51 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 39, 41-42 (2014) ("Koontz will protect property 
rights while also protecting the community by ensuring that developers bear the full 
costs of their projects."). 
156. See Shelley Ross Saxer, When Local Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L. 
REV. 105, 106 (2016) ("[L]egislative actions are subject to public hearings and are 
generally directed to resolving issues affecting the community as a whole. But when 
individual decision making is involved, there is considerable concern about self-dealing, 
special interests, and the potential for abuse of power."). 
157. See Daniel P. Selmi, Takings and Extortion, 68 FLA. L. REV. 323 (2016) 
(rejecting the extortion narrative underlying the Koontz holding). 
158. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (2016). 
159. Id. at 141. 
160. Id. at 142. 
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Also lending support to a broad view of exactions, but from 
more of an economic perspective, Professor Gregory Stein 
suggests that permitting exactions do not result from attempts 
to enhance the public fisc at the expense of developers and 
their buyers, but rather to offset the negative externalities 
that the proposed development would impose on other 
landowners. 161 In some cases, however, restrictions are imposed 
not to eliminate ostensible negative externalities imposed by 
the landowner, but rather to create positive externalities when 
bestowed on recipients favored by local officials.162 
Undoubtedly, exactions do often offset negative 
externalities, a point readily acknowledged in Koontz by 
Justice Alito. 163 However, he also noted that "[s]o long as the 
building permit is more valuable than any just compensation 
the owner could hope to receive for the [property right taken], 
the owner is likely to accede to the government's demand, no 
matter how unreasonable."164 
As I have elaborated upon elsewhere, 165 municipalities have 
informal mechanisms for demanding "volunteered" exactions 
from one-time applicants that elude the formal record, and 
many more ways of ensuring compliance from local developers 
who are repeat players. "Zoning for dollars" is not an academic 
exercise. Unless closely offsetting negative externalities that in 
fact are generated by the project, in a residential context it 
operates as a tax on homebuilders, the incidence of which 
161. Stein, supra note 136, at *3 ("[T]he objective of an exaction is not for the 
government to acquire a property right for its own use or to enrich itself in some other 
way. Rather, the government seeks to ensure that other stakeholders that will suffer as 
a result of the applicant's more intensive use do not bear an unfair portion of the cost of 
that new development."). 
162. See, e.g., George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kela: What's Blight Got 
to Do with It?, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 803, 841 (2008) (noting that in many 
subsidized redevelopment projects, "the local agency typically consults informally with 
private developers before going forward," and that "blatant cronyism or corruption 
might elude easy detection"). 
163. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) 
("A . . . reality of the permitting process is that many proposed land uses threaten to 
impose costs on the public that dedications of property can offset."). 
164. Id. 
165. Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. L.J. 1, 
28-29 (2014) (noting how developers or their attorneys may be engaged in 
undocumented informal bargaining or subject to blunt demands outside of the formal 
development application process). The title analogizes Yale Kamisar's Equal Justice in 
the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN OUR TIME 1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) (comparing respect for defendants' rights 
in the "mansion" of the courtroom with abusive preliminary conduct in the "gatehouse" 
of the police station). 
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largely is passed on to homebuyers, thus ironically making 
housing less affordable. 166 That result would truly be a mark of 
good intentions gone astray. 
2. Regulatory Property 
If small-scale urban land use regulation often is marked by 
exactions from developers, important incentives for their 
cooperation are the awarding of "regulatory property" and 
entrenched rights Property rights are based on sources such as 
state law. 167 One type of asserted right that is particularly 
dubious is "regulatory property," which comprises grants of 
government authority to engage in conduct that is unlawful for 
others. 168 The monopoly on accepting street hails from 
passengers by New York City taxicabs that possess City-issued 
medallions is a classic example. 169 
An increasingly general and pervasive form of regulatory 
property is occupational licensure. While only some five percent 
of workers required licenses to pursue their occupations in the 
1950s, nearly a third do today. 170 While ostensibly promulgated 
to improve product safety and quality, they do so only 
marginally, while increasing prices and reducing availability. 171 
"[T]hanks to the doctrine of Parker antitrust immunity, the one 
entity that can most effectively engage in anti-competitive 
conduct-the government-may do so with impunity, and 
states may effectively nullify federal antitrust laws on behalf of 
private monopolists."172 
166. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 So. CAL. L. REV. 
1167, 1170 (1981) (asserting that "most 'inclusionary' programs are ironically titled," 
since they "are essentially taxes on the production of new housing"). 
167. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests, of 
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain 
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."). 
168. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P, Morriss, The Techrwlogies of Property Rights: 
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
123 (2001) (coining term). See also Carol M. Rose. The Several Futures of Property: Of 
Cyberspace and Folk Tales. Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 
164-65 (1998). 
169. See generally Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The 
Case of New York Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 168 (2013) (supplying 
details). 
170. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Arwther Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014). 
171. Id. at 1096-98. 
172. Timothy Sandefur, Freedom of Competition and the Rhetoric of Federalism: 
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 196 (2015) 
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Companies that have expended considerable sums in 
reliance upon governmental restrictions that subsequently are 
relaxed or eliminated may claim that, as a result, those costs 
are "stranded" (i.e., non-recoverable) and they have suffered 
"deregulatory takings."173 Those arguments have not fared well 
in the courts. 174 
An assertion of regulatory property particularly germane to 
land use was a claim that the loss in value of the transferable 
development rights (TDRs) featured in the Penn Central casel75 
constituted a taking. The TDRs were given to the railroad to 
"mitigate" what otherwise might have been a regulatory taking 
of its air rights above Grand Central Terminal. 176 Owners of 
the TDRs would be permitted instead to develop some 1.2 
million square feet of air rights in the vicinity of Grand Central 
in excess of that permitted owners of those parcels under 
generally applicable zoning. 177 
As recounted by Professor Christopher Serkin, 40 years 
later the air rights were still unused, and had been purchased 
by Midtown TDR Ventures, which planned to sell them for a 
substantial sum in booming Midtown Manhattan real estate 
market.178 However, a change in city zoning restrictions on 
nearby parcels, allegedly at the behest of a neighboring owner, 
deprived the TDRs of value, and Midtown TDR sued. 179 The 
action was dismissed after the neighboring owner paid what 
were described as nominal damages.1so 
(discussing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (upholding anti-competitive 
compacts where they "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative 
command of the state"). 
173. See J. Gregory Sidak &Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach 
of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996) (coining term). 
174. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 
934, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (explaining that businesses affected by regulation likely will 
know the law and seek clarification if necessary) (citing Cruz v. Town of Cicero, No. 99 
C 3286, 2000 WL 369666, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2000). 
175. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a 
discussion of TDRs, see infra Part III.E.3. 
176. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 137. 
177. Serkin, supra note 129, at 914. 
178. Id. 
179. Complaint ii 5, Midtown TDR Ventures LLC v. City of New York, No. l:15-cv-
07647 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015); see also Charles V. Bagli, Owner of Grand Central 
Sues Developer and City for $1.1 Billion Over Air Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/nyregion/owner-of-grand-central-sues-developer-
and-city-for-l-l-billion-over-air-rights.html ( describing litigation). 
180. Complaint for Notice of Dismissal, No. l:15-cv-07647 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 10, 2016); Charles V. Bagli, Owners of Grand Central Drop Lawsuit, Clearing Way 
for a 1,401-Foot-Tall Skyscraper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2016. 
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A somewhat similar attempt to assert that government 
benefits were entrenched as const~tutional property occurred in 
Kaufmann's Carousel, Inc. v. (]ity of Syracuse Industrial 
Development Agency. 181 There, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully 
resisted the condemnation of easements on grounds including 
that they had acquired their lease as the result of a previous 
condemnation, which they asserted was a determination of 
"public use," so that the subsequent condemnation could not be 
for a public use. 182 
While these cases might be deemed of passing interest, they 
point to a much more profound problem-that of recipients of 
government largesse attempting to entrench those benefits in 
the form of constitutionally protected property. 183 We are likely 
to see more attempts to treat stranded costs as "property," 
given the disruptions that new internet-based platform 
companies are having on established, regulated industries. 184 
Thus, there is a danger that what seem to be "mitigations" 
based on fairness, such as the award of TD Rs, might be ossified 
as entrenched property with a harmful result. 
E. Other New Land Use Regulatory Techniques 
While development exactions as a condition for project 
approvals are perhaps the most common technique for 
localities seeking land use flexibility and revenue, others have 
played a prominent role, as well. 
1. Grand Bargains 
One device, building upon traditional local politics, urges 
the formation of transitory coalitions of disparate interest 
groups, assembled ad hoc to seize the moment and enact and 
entrench zoning grand bargains. 185 However, such a plan would 
create vested property rights on a grand scale and, one again, 
hinder future adaptation to change.186 The argument for 
entrenchment is undermined by the fact that "uncertainty 
181. 750 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
182. Id. at 221. 
183. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding 
Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879 (2011). 
184. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 112 (2016). 
185. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 
101 lOWAL. REV. 91 (2015). 
186. See Steven J. Eagle, On Engineering Urban Densi{ication, 4 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 73, 78-79 (2015). 
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concerning government policy is analytically equivalent to 
general market uncertainty. The prevailing assumption in our 
society that market solutions for allocating risk are preferable 
to government remedies is therefore equally applicable when 
the risks to be allocated arise from legal transitions."187 
2. Public-Private Partnerships 
Public Private Partnerships for real estate development 
project are long-term contractual agreements between 
government agencies and private developers, whereby "the 
skills and assets of each sector are shared in delivering a 
development project."188 The private entity might own a ground 
lease and manage the project, with the agency maintaining 
control through ownership of the fee simple and, perhaps, an 
equity interest.189 One form of public-private partnership is a 
"business improvement district" (BID), in which businesses 
located in specified geographical areas consent to the 
assessment of taxes to pay for enhanced amenities such as 
security and sanitation.190 
Public Private Partnerships have been attacked for alleged 
failures to provide adequate protection for individual rights 
and democratic values. 191 "The eclipse of traditional land use 
planning procedures by cities' wholehearted embrace of 
development agreements and similar bilateral negotiated 
approaches leaves next to no room for the public."192 More 
specifically, BIDs have been criticized as resulting from "a 
187. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 520 (1986). 
188. Thomas M. Gallas & Cheryl A. O'Neill, Public Private Partnerships: Design 
and Finance Transforming Urban Neighbor/wads, 42 REAL ESTATE REV. J., Art. 2 
(2013). 
189. Id. 
190. See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement 
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366 (1999) (describing BIDs 
as "one of the most intriguing and controversial recent developments in urban 
governance" and "[c]ombining public and private, as well as city government and 
neighborhood elements"). 
191. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Joseph C. Dugan, The Human Side of Public-
Private Partnerships: From New Deal Regulation to Administrative Law Management, 
102 IOWA L. REV. 883 (2017). 
192. David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for 
Investment in America's Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 661 (2007) (quoting 
Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for 
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use 
Decisions, Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36--37 (2005)). 
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series of flawed and contentious Supreme Court decisions 
preferring localism over equality and privatization over free 
speech."193 
Furthermore, sales and long-term leases of municipal 
infrastructure to private entities that will run them often have 
proved ill-advised and used to temporarily buttress the 
finances of distressed cities. 194 "Unfortunately, all of these 
stabilization methods are characterized by short-term cash 
infusions that produce disproportionate future expenses or lost 
future revenue."195 
3. Transferable Development Rights 
TDRs are issued by government and permit the recipients 
to transfer development precluded by regulation of their 
existing parcels to other parcels they own or acquire. "Simply 
put, TDR programs separate the development potential of a 
parcel from the land itself and create a market where that 
development potential can be sold."196 Thus, an owner in a 
"sending" zone receives TDRs in lieu of development in that 
area that government wishes to protect, and can utilize the 
TDRs to develop acquired property in a designated "receiving" 
zone more intensively than its former owner was permitted. 197 
The classic example of the use of TDRs was to "mitigate" 
what otherwise might have been a taking in Penn Central. 198 
As the Court explained: "While these rights may well not have 
constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the 
rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial 
burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that 
reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact 
193. Wayne Batchis, Business Improvement Districts and the Constitution: The 
Troubling Necessity of Privatized Government for Urban Revitalization, 38 HAsTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 91, 92 (2010). 
194. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 
1118, 1168--69 (2014) (describing a problematic long-term lease of parking meters by a 
"desperate" city of Chicago, whereby an investment group would receive $11.6 billion 
from "a deal that paid the city $1.15 billion for a one-time budget fix"). 
195. Samir D. Parikh & Zhaochen He, Failing Cities and the Red Queen 
Phenomenon, 58 B.C. L. REV. 599, 610 (2017). 
196. Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et. al., Transferable Development Rights and 
Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW. 441, 446 (1998). 
197. Id. at 446--48. 
198. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978). For 
discussion, see supra notes 175--177 and accompanying text. 
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of regulation."199 Notably, the shifting of development rights 
considered in Penn Central were from one part of the same 
tract of land to another.200 
I have elsewhere criticized TDRs as wrongfully depriving 
owners in the receiving zones of property without just 
compensation.201 First, as in exactions schemes generally, the 
ability of localities to benefit from the sale of development 
approvals for what Jerold Kayden in Zoning for Dollars 
described as in excess of "first tier" rights encourages over-
regulation and corruption.202 In addition, if dense development 
is permissible on a certain parcel when the applicant owns 
TDRs, that development should have been permissible had the 
applicant for the same exact project been the original 
landowner. 203 
Professor Serkin has argued that, while my argument about 
over-regulation was "undoubtedly correct," the "strong form" of 
my argument "misconstrues the kinds of tradeoffs that are 
ubiquitous in land use controls."204 He added that "zoning is 
much more fluid than this and frequently represents dynamic 
tradeoffs," so that a city may desire density limitations in the 
receiving area, but "may have an even greater interest in 
protecting a historic building."205 Awarding TDRs in this 
situation "represents nothing more than a straightforward 
cost-benefit analysis ."206 
The division of a municipality into zoning districts does 
represent a judgment regarding relative value among 
permissible uses being situated in one area as opposed to 
another. Also, the establishment of new uses in one part of 
town might legitimately occasion rebalancing of other uses in a 
different part of town. 
However, ad hoc decisions awarding TDRs also constitute 
ad hoc decisions reducing ownership rights. The point is that 
local officials are not making abstract decisions that historic 
features should be preserved and other abstract decision that 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 130-31 ("In deciding whether a particular governmental action has 
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on 
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole-here, 
the city tax block designated as the 'landmark site."') 
201. Eagle, supra note 133, at 34-36. 
202. See Kayden, supra note 124. For discussion, see supra notes 123-128, and 
accompanying text. 
203. Eagle, supra note 133, at 34~36. 
204. Serkin, supra note 129, at 926-27. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 927. 
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more development might be permissible in another area. 
Rather, as Professor Juergensmeyer and his colleagues more 
aptly put it, the idea is to "separate the development potential 
of a parcel from the land itself and create a market where that 
development potential can be sold."207 The potential of "a 
parcel" is "sold" in essentially a barter transaction to the 
aggrieved owner of the historic site. 
Concerns about TDRs mostly have involved the extent to 
which they were adequate substitutes for reductions in the 
rights of property owners.208 However, I distinguish TDR 
schemes in which owners of land in the sending areas are 
compensated through reciprocity of advantage from those 
schemes in which the municipality arrogates to itself the 
benefits of restrictions giving value to the TD Rs. 
In Barancik v. County of Marin, 209 development in the 
Nicasio Valley north of San Francisco was stringently limited 
to preserve the "beautiful rural landscape" and agricultural 
use. 210 The TDR scheme "permitted ranchers in the valley to 
sell to other property owners in the valley the right to develop 
within the regulations of the community. A purchaser could 
accumulate more than one development right."211 In response 
to the rhetorical question as to how the TDR scheme differed 
from the sale of the police power, the Ninth Circuit responded 
that buyers "are not being given a dispensation from zoning by 
payment of a fee to the state," but rather "are being permitted 
to accumulate development rights in the same area by a price 
paid to the owner of the rights."212 The court added that the 
county "is rightly indifferent" as to who does the limited 
amount of development permitted, and "lets the market decide 
the price."213 
In the prevalent Penn Central type of TDR scheme, the 
government is not at all indifferent as to who does the 
development, but rather insists that it be done by the entity to 
207. Juergensmeyer, supra note 196, at 446. 
208. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 
(1973); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also 
Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been 
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 
307, 356-57 (1998) (describing substantial practical problems faced by TDR recipients). 
209. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988). 
210. Id. at 835. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 
213. Id. 
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which it has awarded rights or its assignee, for the purpose of 
staving off a possible need to pay just compensation for a 
restriction it imposed. 
Professor Serkin correctly asserts that the protection of a 
"historic building" through use of TDRs might have greater 
benefit to society than the burden placed on owners in the 
receiving zone.214 But conferring benefit on society is an 
attribute associated with both the police power and the takings 
power.215 A feature implicit in Penn Central TDR schemes is 
that recipients who are singled out for worthiness are accorded 
special development rights in specified zones designed to be 
attractive to them. This seems counter to principles of fairness 
enunciated in Armstrong, 216 and the centuries-old observation 
reiterated in Kelo v. City of New London,217 that "a law that 
takes property from A. and gives it to B . . . is against all 
reason and justice."218 
Perhaps the best answer to preserving a "historic building" 
was enunciated just as TDRs first were coming into vogue: 
"Rather than utilizing unreliable methods of shifting 
preservation costs onto a select group (whether developers or 
ardent supporters of landmark preservation), as is done 
by TDR systems, the municipality itself should assume 
responsibility for saving landmarks."219 
4. Land Use Regulation as Neighborhood Property 
In Fee Simple Obsolete, 220 Professor Lee Anne Fennell 
suggested that government or another entity might be able to 
acquire a "callable fee," whereby property within a "callblock" 
would be available for subsequent repurposing.221 While she 
would capture the value of large-scale redevelopment for the 
214. Serkin, supra note 129, at 927. 
215. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987) (noting 
that a government action that is a "legitimate exercise of the police power does not, of 
course, insulate it from a takings challenge"). 
216. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (quoted in Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123--24 (1978) (asserting that public 
burdens" should not be "disproportionately concentrated" on the few.")). 
217. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
218. Id. at 477 n.3 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798)). 
219. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE 
L.J. 1101, 1122 n.14 (1975) 
220. Fennell, supra note 19. 
221. Id. at 1482-85. "Properties within these 'callblocks' would be sold subject to a 
call option. These call options would make each new possessory owner subject to 
having her property repurchased later, along with the other properties in the 
callblock[.J" Id. at 1484. 
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community, the economist Robert Nelson argued that zoning 
instantiates collective neighborhood property rights belonging 
to the individuals in the neighborhood.222 He proposed that 
supermajorities of owners in neighborhoods they define be able 
to sell all parcels, thus reaping for existing owners the 
monetary value of the one consolidated parcel in excess of the 
aggregate value of the many parcels that comprised it.223 A 
similar proposal for "land assembly districts" was made by 
Professors Michael Heller and Rick Hills. 224 
However, these proposals permit a self-selected group of 
owners to custom design an area in which a super-majority can 
arrogate to itself property interests of the dissenters. That 
might result in land having more pecuniary value, but it would 
be at the cost of the autonomy of the unwilling participants.225 
V. GOOD INTENTIONS AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
One area where good intentions have been notably 
ineffective has been the provision of affordable housing. As I 
have discussed elsewhere, the popularity of affordable housing 
results from its being a metaphor, not a policy or even a shared 
specific goal for reducing housing prices in areas enjoying 
economic prosperity and fine natural and cultural amenities.226 
Economic prosperity largely results from the presence of a 
deep pool of talented workers and competing firms who can 
utilize their specialized skills, together with those with the 
wherewithal and tastes to add vibrancy.227 The resulting 
agglomeration makes for great cities. However, expanding 
222. Robert H. Nelson, A Private Property Right Theory of Zoning, 11 URB. LAW. 
713 (1979). 
223. Nelson, supra note 91, at 834 (proposing that owners of land with 
supermajorities by number of parcels or fair market value in neighborhoods they define 
have powers to designate use or sale). 
224. Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1465, 1468 (2008). 
225. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Devolutionary Proposals and Contractarian 
Principles, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 184-91 (F. H. Buckley, ed. 
1999). 
226. See Eagle, supra note 80. 
227. See generally GLAESER supra note 111. 
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cities tend to become congested, which offsets agglomerations 
benefits.228 Sometimes agglomeration enhances activities that 
are undesirable, as well. 229 
"Amenities" is an expansive term encompassing those 
attributes that make residential living aesthetically pleasing 
and vital. One way municipalities can jumpstart the process, 
which is associated with Richard Florida, is by providing the 
requisite amenities to lure the "creative class."230 Some have 
been skeptical of the concept, 231 and others thought that in 
many cases causation worked in the other direction, with 
prosperity leading to amenities. 232 
In his 2017 book The New Urban Crisis, Florida 
acknowledged that the high level of prosperity that the creative 
class brought to a few cities that he celebrated 15 years earlier 
was not an urban panacea.233 While our urban crisis of the 
1960s and 1970s, he asserted, was marked by "economic 
abandonment of cities" and "white flight," "persistent poverty," 
and crime,234 one element of our "new urban crisis" involves the 
"deep and growing economic gap" between a handful of 
"superstar" cities and technology hubs and other areas, which 
Florida calls "winner-take-all urbanism."235 Closely associated 
are the "extraordinary high and increasingly unaffordable 
housing prices and staggering levels of inequality" in superstar 
cities. 236 But broader dimensions include the "growing 
inequality, segregation, and sorting" within all cities, the 
movement of "poverty, insecurity, and crime" into the suburbs, 
and the "crisis of urbanization in the developing world."237 
228. See Nestor M. Davidson & John J. lnfranca, The Sharing Economy As an 
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 215, 225 (2016) (noting that congestion is 
the "inverse" of the "many benefits that accrue from the proximity and density"). 
229. See Schleicher, supra note 110, at 1529 (referring to "factors that have 
increasing returns to scale but a negative effect'' as "negative agglomeration"). 
230. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND How IT'S 
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002). 
231. See Steven J. Eagle, The Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. 
L. REV. 1229, 1262 (2010). 
232. See Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local 
Economic Development, 77 U. Cm. L. REV. 311, 328 (2010) (noting that in many 
instances, such as Silicon Valley, it was economic prosperity that led to the creation of 
amenities). 
233. RICHARD FLoRIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS: How OUR CITIES ARE 
INCREASING INEQUALITY, DEEPENING SEGREGATION, AND FAILING THE MIDDLE 
CLASS-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2017). 
234. Id. at 5. 
235. Id. at 5--6. 
236. Id. at 6. 
237. Id. at 7-8. 
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In outlying areas, the loss of manufacturing jobs has 
contributed to rural America being the "new inner city."238 The 
plight of rural areas was highlighted by Anne Case and Angus 
Deaton's path breaking work on the increase in "deaths of 
despair"-death by drugs, alcohol and suicide.239 "[F]or the first 
time, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
now reports declines in life expectancy among less-educated 
rural whites, especially in impoverished and remote counties of 
Appalachia."240 
Recent evidence suggests that "[a]s young people and 
builders have shifted their focus toward trendier urban 
markets, overall housing construction has declined."241 Recent 
census data indicates, though, that suburban growth is 
increasing again relative to growth in cities.242 Some evidence 
suggests a mixed pattern, with increased growth in the urban 
core in some cities, and more sprawl in others,243 with already-
dense metropolitan areas becoming denser, and sprawling 
metro areas spreading out further. 244 "In some of the country's 
largest and most prosperous markets, such as New York, San 
Francisco, Boston and Los Angeles, housing construction has 
been stronger than normal in the urban core but weaker in the 
suburbs, where new housing can be built abundantly and more 
cheaply ... "245 
238. See Janet Adamy and Paul Overberg, Rural America is the New Inner City, 
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2017 at Al, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rural-america-is-the-
new-inner-city-1495817008. 
239. Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in 
Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 
PROCEEDINGS NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 15078, 15078 (2015), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/112/49/15078. "This increase for whites was largely 
accounted for by increasing death rates from drug and alcohol poisonings, suicide, and 
chronic liver diseases and cirrhosis. Although all education groups saw increases in 
mortality from suicide and poisonings, and an overall increase in external cause 
mortality, those with less education saw the most marked increases." Id. 
240. Daniel T. Lichter & James P. Ziliak, The Rural-Urban Interface: New 
Patterns of Spatial Interdependence and Inequality in America, 672 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & Soc. SCI. 6, 20 (2017). 
241. Laura Kusisto, Why Millennials Are (Partly) to Blame for the Housing 
Shortage, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-millennials-
are-partly-to-blame-for-the-housing-shortage-1495445403. 
242. Thomas H, Frey, City Growth Dips Below Suburban Growth, Census Shows, 
BROOKINGS, May 30, 2017). 
243. Jed Kolko, Seattle Climbs but Austin Sprawls: The Myth of the Return to 
Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2rKDQ70. 
244. Id. (contrasting dense cities such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco 
with sprawling cities such as Austin and San Antonio). 
245. Kusisto, supra note 241. 
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This combination of faster population growth in 
outlying areas and bigger price increases in cities points 
to limited housing supply as a curb on urban growth, 
pushing people out to the suburbs. It's a reminder that 
where people live reflects not only what they 
want - but also what's available and what it costs.246 
It is important to note that neither population growth nor 
diversity necessarily contributes to prosperity since, as 
Professor Lee Anne Fennell observed, prosperity has a function 
of "agglomeration-friendly and congestion-mitigating traits," 
and "[t]he challenge is to assemble participants together whose 
joint consumption and production activities will maximize 
social value."247 Furthermore, even beyond the incompatibility 
of productive uses, a lack of proper controls of open city spaces 
can result in a "tragedy of the urban commons"248 in which 
"chronic street nuisances" drive out other users.249 
A. Preservation of Community 
Political entitles have their own character, which is another 
way of saying that they favor the particular values and desires 
of existing residents over those of putative possible residents, 
or over what some might fancy to be the universal values of a 
better world. The perceptive land use practitioner and scholar 
Richard Babcock referred to this tendency as "municipal 
primogeniture."250 Since Euclid, we have recognized that 
parochial interests sometimes must yield to the common 
good. 251 One basic problem, however, is discerning what the 
common good is. 
While the term "intersectionality" generally is associated 
with problems pertaining to race that are complex, intertwined, 
246. Kolko, supra note 243. 
247. Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2014) 
(internal citations omitted). 
248. Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & 
POL 'y REV. 281, 298--99 (2016). 
249. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1996) 
(defining "chronic street nuisances" as protracted annoying behavior in public spaces, 
such as aggressive panhandling or graffiti, that drives out other users). 
250. RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 150 (1966). 
251. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926) ("It is not 
meant by this [upholding of local autonomy], however, to exclude the possibility of 
cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the 
municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way."). 
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and thus particularly difficult to solve, 252 many other land 
use problems have similar characteristics. The great 
environmentalist John Muir made the point over a century ago 
that "[w]hen we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it 
hitched to everything else in the universe."253 
The ties that bind people within neighborhoods exemplify 
interrelationships. An especially valued amenity is 
preservation of neighborhood character. This term relates to 
the deep satisfaction that many people enjoy in being deeply 
rooted in a community.254 Established communities are 
important to the creation and maintenance of what we now 
refer to as "social capital."255 
In the affordable housing context, rootedness leads 
to preferences that often conflict. Upper-middle class 
neighborhoods cling tenaciously to preservation of their 
character as stable, low-density areas of handsome single-
family homes, sometimes adjoining quaint shopping areas or 
scenic natural vistas.256 Such residents, and the local officials 
they elect, seek to protect their way of life from those who 
would settle for housing that is less attractive, but more 
affordable.257 The large inequality between the growing upper-
middle class and the lower socioeconomic classes has a 
"physical dimension in that most metropolitan areas differ 
greatly by the size and price of the homes m their 
neighborhoods and communities."258 Recent data analysis 
suggests that there is a growing disparity of incomes within 
252. See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (introducing term into the 
legal literature). 
253. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 110 (Sierra Club Books 1988) 
(1911). 
254. See generally, JOHN BRINCKERHOFF JACKSON, A SENSE OF PLACE, A SENSE OF 
TIME (1994). 
255. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALoNE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000) ("Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects 
and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to 
connections among individuals-social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them.") 
256. For a pertinent example, see DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW 
UPPER CLASS AND HOW THEY GOT THERE (2000) (describing the folkways of "hobos," the 
contemporary meld of bourgeoisie and bohemians, who lead expansive upper-middle 
class lifestyles while professing devotion to the verities of the simple life through 
consumption of very expensive kitchen equipment, primitive art, and eco-tourism). 
257. See FISCHEL, supra note 97, at 18 (describing how the "mercenary concern 
with property values" of "'homevoters' and their elected representatives shape zoning 
in homogeneous communities"). 
258. Stephen J. Rose, The Growing Size and Incomes of the Upper Middle Class 14 
(Urban Institute Income and Benefits Policy Center, June 2016). 
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neighborhoods of large American cities, and that this results in 
lifelong effects on international mobility and opportunity for 
children exposed to it.259 
This proclivity of the upper-middle class to protect its 
position and pass its status on to its children, which largely 
takes the form of exclusionary zoning, with the ensuing 
exclusive school districts, recently was criticized by Richard 
Reeves in his book Dream Hoarders. 260 As Thomas Edsall 
recently added, upper-middle class Democrats might support 
redistributive taxation, but not affordable housing or having a 
child lose a place at Princeton to a poorer worthy student.261 
In a similar manner, traditional working class 
neighborhoods, often built around shared ethnicity, faith, and 
extended family, cling to their heritage. 262 In both cases, 
neighborhood preservation has the effect of impinging upon fair 
housing, which might be looked at as intentional, 263 or 
alternatively resulting from the fact that "the very notion 
of community, however broadly conceived, depends on 
exclusion."264 
Similar impulses for neighborhood preservation have led 
inner-city residents to protest "gentrification." Recent evidence 
suggests that gentrification might result in substantial part 
from an increase in the number of higher-income households 
with a reduced tolerance for commuting,265 with recent lower 
259. Andreoli Francesco & Eugenio Peluso, So Close Yet so Unequal: Spatial 
Inequality in American Cities, (Luxembourg Inst. of Socio-Econ. Research (LISER) 
Working Paper Series 2017-11, July 13, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3003959 
(using Geni-type indices investigate patterns and consequences of spatial inequality in 
American cities over the last 35 years). 
260. RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: How THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE 
CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT (2017) (asserting that "opportunity hoarding" among the upper middle 
class through devices such as zoning, occupational licensing, schooling and college 
application procedures, reduces mobility and results in a less open society and less 
competitive economy). 
261. Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Has the Democratic Party Gotten Too Rich for Its 
Own Good?, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2sqAqXI. 
262. See generally, ALAN EHRENHALT, THE LOST CITY: THE FORGOTTEN VIRTUES 
OF COMMUNITY IN AMERICA (1996). 
263. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 
92 VA. L. REV. 437, 437 (2006) ("Developers will select common amenities not only on 
the basis of which amenities are inherently welfare-maximizing for the residents, but 
also on the basis of which amenities most effectively deter undesired residents from 
purchasing homes therein."). 
264. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 492 
(2017). 
265. See Lena Edlund, et al., Bright Minds, Big Rent: Gentrification and the 
Rising Returns to Skill 2 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper 
No. CES-WP-16-36, 2016), https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2016/CES-WP-16-36.pdf. 
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urban crime rates also playing a role.266 Residents who are 
homeowners may want to sell to upscale and often-young 
buyers at what they consider inflated prices. But inner-city 
tenants are squeezed out by dramatically higher rents, without 
the consolation of a handsome return. 267 
The interaction between urban displacement and 
gentrification can be "sensitive to income inequality, density, 
and varied preferences for different types of spatial 
amenities."268 On the other hand, sometimes decaying 
neighborhoods are spruced up, and ensuing higher real estate 
tax collections permit often-strapped municipalities to make 
vitally-needed improvements to local schools, roads, and 
hospitals. 269 
In a more general sense, attempts at historic preservation 
of existing structures and patterns of human association can be 
at variance with urban culture itself, which might be "defined 
by dynamism, vitality, and an ability to adapt to and 
accommodate population and market shifts."270 A recent study 
by Ann Owens found that "the geographic deconcentration of 
assisted housing, the result of several housing programs 
initiated since the 1970s, only modestly reduced metropolitan-
area poverty concentration from 1980 to 2009 .... Even though 
a substantial policy shift occurred, its effectiveness in reducing 
poverty concentration was tempered by the existing context of 
durable urban inequality."271 As one supporter of fair and 
affordable housing concluded: 
[T]he road to the current land use regulatory context in 
the United States is a full century long. The first six 
decades of that process took on the appearance of a 
266. See Ingrid Gould Ellen, et al., Has Falling Crime Invited Gentrification? 
(U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ.Studies Paper No. CES-WP-17-27, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930242. 
267. See generally, Miriam Zuk, et al., Gentrification, Displacement and the Role of 
Public Investment: A Literature Review (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working 
Paper 2015---05, 2015). 
268. Geoff Boeing, The Effects of Inequality, Density, and Heterogeneous 
Residential Preferences on Urban Displacement and Metropolitan Structure: An 
Agent-Based Model 1, (Dec. 20, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id =2939933. 
269. See J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405, 405---06 
(2003). 
270. Anika Sing Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood Conservation 
Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L.J. 1525, 1525 (2015). 
271. Ann Owens, Housing Policy and Urban Inequality: Did the Transformation of 
Assisted Housing Reduce Poverty Concentration?, 94 (1) Soc. FORCES 325, 326 (Sept. 
2015). 
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headlong race toward exclusionary policies while the 
last four decades have been marked by occasional but 
ultimately not transformative attempts to press the 
brakes and restore balance. None of those attempts 
have fundamentally reshaped how people in 
communities on the ground think about land use 
regulation. 272 
B. Assistance to the poor and inner cities 
The clearest intentions regarding affordable housing relate 
to the provision of homes for low- and moderate-income 
families. Even here, however, a number of different goals work 
at cross-purposes. Government subsidies for the construction of 
low-income housing seems the most direct affordable housing 
device, with the major exception of public housing projects, 
which in many cases proved disastrous. 273 
In his reflections on the first 25 years of the Journal of 
Affordable Housing and Community Development, Professor 
Tim Iglesias advocated that fair housing was "joined at the hip" 
with the Journal's principal concerns, and that the Journal has 
a "unique opportunity to provide a forum for integrating fair 
housing issues" into its existing affordable housing and 
community development focus. 274 Another need for a holistic 
approach advanced by Professor Iglesias relates to whether 
racial and socioeconomic residential segregation should be 
dealt with the using "traditional integration model," which 
focuses on the community as a geographical and social unit, or 
using the "individual access to the opportunity structure 
model," which focuses on the location of households vis-a-vis 
good schools, workplaces, medical facilities, cultural amenities, 
and the like. 275 
One of the more successful affordable housing programs has 
been the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which "is 
one of the few government resources dedicated to helping low 
272. Thomas Silverstein, State Land Use Regulation in the Era of Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing, 24 J. AFFORD. Rous. 305, 328 (2015). 
273. See EUGENE J. MEEHAN, THE QUAIJTY OF FEDERAL POLICYMAKING: 
PROGRAMMED FAILURE IN PuBLIC HOUSING 66-87 (1979) (discussing the demolition of 
the infamous Pruitt-Igoe Housing Project and the St. Louis Housing Authority). 
274. Tim Iglesias, Affordable Housing, Fair Housing and Community 
Development: Joined at the Hip, We Need to Learn to Walk Together, 25 J. AFFORDABLE 
Rous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 195, 198 (2017). 
275. Tim Iglesias, Two Competing Concepts of Residential Integration 24, (Univ. of 
S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2017-09, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965214. 
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income families find safe, decent and affordable housing."276 "In 
its simplest form, LIHTC 'subsidizes the acquisition, 
construction, and/or rehabilitation of rental property by private 
developers."'277 However, after its recent review of federal 
housing finance data, The New York Times, while noting that 
LIHTC is the nation's "biggest source of funding for affordable 
housing," concluded that in the largest metropolitan areas 
housing utilizing LIHTC is "disproportionately built in 
majority nonwhite communities."278 Furthermore, the value 
of the tax credits is highly dependent on the level of 
corporate taxation, so that contemplated Trump administration 
reductions in rates already suggests significant cutbacks in 
their use.279 Another popular program, which does not require 
subsidies for capital investment, is Section 8 housing,280 which 
subsidizes rents in scattered private residential buildings. 
However, as Section 8 contracts expire, the housing might 
revert to market rate, and federal funding for the program 
might be cut substantially.2s1 
Another major issue, largely intersecting with questions of 
race, is affordable housing in more affluent suburbs. In 1968, 
the Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbade the denial of housing 
opportunities on the basis of "race, color, religion, or national 
origin."282 Yet in 2015, writing for the majority in Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
276. Lance Bocarsly & Rachel Rosner, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit: A 
Valuable Tool for Financing the Development of Affordable Housing, 33 THE PRAC. 
REAL EST. LAW. 29, 30 (2017). 
277. Courtney Lauren Anderson, Affirmative Action for Affordable Housing, 60 
How. L.J. 105, 140 (2016) (quoting Paul Duncan et al., Tax Incentives for Economic 
Development: What is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit?, in TAX POLICY CTR, THE 
TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK (2009)). 
278. John Eligon, et al., Program to Spur Low-Income Housing is Keeping Cities 
Segregated, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2tBQ06t (citing the claim of fair-
housing advocates that "the government is essentially helping to maintain entrenched 
racial divides, even though federal law requires government agencies to promote 
integration."). 
279. See Robert McCartney, Trump's Budget Plans Have Already Cut Financial 
Support for Low-Cost Housing, WASH. POST, July 1, 2017, http://wapo.st/2szlcNj?tid= 
ss_mail&utm_term=.dl046d506a85 (noting that "the loss of tax-credit financing has 
had its most severe impact in rural areas, towns or small cities, where investors are 
wary of financing affordable housing in the first place"). 
280. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982 (2015) (the program is more formally known as 
the Federal Housing Choice Voucher program). 
281. See Jose A. DelReal, Trump Administration Considers $6 Billion Cut 
to HUD Budget, WASH. POST, March 8, 2017, http://wapo.st/2mDrips?tid= 
ss_mail&utm_term=.3a9a5ccc0c9c ("Budgets for public housing authorities---city and 
state agencies that provide subsidized housing and vouchers to local residents - would 
be among the hardest hit. Under the preliminary budget, those operational funds 
would be reduced by $600 million, or 13 percent."). 
282. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-06 (2012). 
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Communities Project, 283 Justice Kennedy related that patterns 
of racial segregation had continued.284 The petitioners had 
argued that Texas allocated tax credits intended to assist low-
income families obtain affordable housing disproportionately to 
predominately black inner-city areas.285 The 5-4 majority held 
that petitioners could utilize evidence of disproportionate 
impact on protected groups in establishing their case, and need 
not show discriminatory intent.286 Three weeks later, the HUD 
issued rules on "Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing" 
("AFFH") that required localities to collect detailed statistical 
data as a prelude to stricter enforcement. 2s7 
However, as noted by Professor Kenneth Stahl, "[e]fforts to 
break down these zoning barriers have faced fierce political 
resistance,"288 and "the issue of affordable housing threatens to 
break up the democratic party coalition between affluent white 
suburbanites and lower-income minorities."289 Perhaps the 
best-known litigation involving the duty of localities accepting 
HUD funds to affirmatively further affordable housing involved 
Westchester County, N.Y., an affluent area north of New York 
City.290 In July 2017, HUD reversed the long-asserted view it 
held during the Obama administration and during the first few 
months of the Trump administration that Westchester had not 
complied with the affordable housing promises it made as a 
condition of receiving HUD subsidies. 291 
283. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
284. Id. at 2515-16. 
285. Id. at 2514. 
286. Id. 
287. See generally "Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing," 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.). 
288. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 491 
(2017). 
289. Id. at 491 n.16 (citing Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Can Hillary Manage Her 
Unruly Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/ 
opinion/campaign-stops/can-hillary-manage-her-unrulcoalition.html?smprod=nytcore-
ipad&smid =nytcore-ipad-share). 
290. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the county 
made false certifications to HUD to obtain federal funding for housing and community 
development, but that the fact issue of whether the falsity was intentional precluded 
summary judgment). 
291. Sarah Maslin Nir, For Westchester, 11th Time Is Charm In Fight 
Over Fair Housing, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
201 7 /07 /21/nyregion/westchester-fair-housing-hud-trump.html. ("The agency's decision, 
delivered to the county in a July 14 letter, was based on a review of a wning analysis, 
versions of which had been rejected 10 times under the Obama administration as 
insufficient proof that the problem had been fixed." A spokesman for County Executive 
Rob Astorino declared the new HUD position a "vindication for Westchester County.") 
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Dr. Ben Carson, the Trump administration HUD secretary, 
earlier had condemned "government-engineered attempts to 
legislate racial equality .... "292 However, in July 2017 Carson 
resisted calls to rescind the AFFH rule, saying instead that 
HUD would "reinterpret" it. 293 "I probably am not going to mess 
with something the Supreme Court has weighed in 
on [in Inclusive Communities]," Carson said, "[i]n terms of 
interpreting what it means-that's where the concentration is 
going to be."294 
1. Dignity 
Human dignity is an important norm, but it is not well 
defined. For present purposes, a good beginning is "the Kantian 
injunction to treat every [person] as an end, not as a means."295 
More germane here, Professor Carol Rose recently explored the 
extent to which devices such as racially restrictive covenants 
running with the land, which were legally enforceable in the 
United States during the first half of the last century, deprived 
racial minorities of their dignity. 296 Furthermore, while the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has had an "immense" 
impact in housing development, early on it equated 
neighborhood stability with racial segregation, 297 and in many 
ways its record with respect to the African-American 
community has been "terrible."298 "The FHA began redlining 
292. Ben S. Carson, Experimenting With Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES, 
July 23, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-
housingrules-try-to-accom plish-/. 
293. Joseph Lawler & Al Weaver, Ben Carson: HUD Will "Reinterpret" Obama 




295. Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INTL. L. 
848, 849 (1983) (adding that "[r]espect for the intrinsic worth of every person should 
mean that individuals are not to be perceived or treated merely as instruments or 
objects of the will of others"). 
296. See Carol M. Rose, Racially Restrictive Covenants-Were They Dignity 
Takings?, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 939 (2016). 
297. See generally John Kimble, Insuring Inequality: The Role of the Federal 
Housing Administration in the Urban Ghettoization of African Americans, 32 L. & Soc. 
INQUIRY 399 (2007). "If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that 
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes. A change 
in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in 
values." Id. at 405 (quoting 1938 FHA underwriting manual). 
298. See David J. Reiss, The Federal Housing Administration and African-
American Homeownership), A.B.A. J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954157. 
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African-American communities at its very beginning. Its later 
days have been marred by high default and foreclosure rates in 
those same communities."299 
In present-day New York City, critics have assailed the 
"poor door," a separate lobby for moderate-income units 
required in luxury buildings as a condition of tax subsidies, "as 
reminiscent of Jim Crow segregation and symbolic of the 
increasing and perverse levels of economic inequality in our 
cities."300 Some elected officials have advocated legislation 
providing that lower-income tenants admitted to an apartment 
building through such considerations as the mandates of 
government subsidy programs have access to the same 
amenities as market-rate tenants. 301 The amenity-related 
policies of landlords to which they object were characterized by 
one state senator as a "form of apartheid,"302 and the recent 
"poor door" controversy in Manhattan is a notable case in 
point. 303 
While dignity typically is regarded as a moral imperative, it 
need not be instantiated in the level of housing amenities 
one possesses. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt recently 
distinguished between equality and sufficiency. 304 Along the 
same lines, another philosopher, Michael Walzer, distinguished 
between those spheres where it was important that all possess 
the wherewithal for basic life activities (for example, 
transportation) and those in which the market should govern 
(for example, new luxury automobiles as opposed to well-worn 
used cars). 305 
299. Id. 
300. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Incluswn, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 530-31 
(2017) (citing Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning's Contributwns to Both 
Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585, 595 (2015)). 
301 See Corinne Lestch, Elected Officials Want to Ban 'Poor Doors' Approved by 
Bloomberg Administration, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 26, 2014, http://www.nydaily 
news.com/new-york/elected-officials-ban-poor-doors-approved-bloomberg-
administration-article-1.1880874 (noting demands for zoning change precluding the 
practice). 
302. Lauren C. Wittlin, Access Denied: The Tale of Two Tenants and Building 
Amenities, 31 TOURO L. REV. 615, 616 (2015) (citation omitted). 
303. See Mireya Navarro, "Poor Door" in a New York Tower Opens a Fight 
Over Affordable Housing, N.Y. TlMES, Aug. 26, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/08/27/nyregion/separate-entryways-for-new-york-condo-buyers-and-renters-
create-an-affordable-housing-dilemma.html?mcubz=O (discussing a proposed luxury 
apartment building in which mandated affordable units would have a separate 
entrance, lobby, and street address). 
304. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON INEQUALITY (2015). 
305. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 10-17 (1983). 
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2. People or Places 
There has been a lively debate as to whether government 
programs to relieve poverty should be people-based or place-
based. 306 This conventional bifurcation, according to Professor 
Nestor Davidson, distinguishes between strategies to "invest in 
individuals, often with the explicit goal of allowing those 
individuals to move to a better life," and programs that "seek to 
reinvigorate distressed neighborhoods."307 This problem 
pertains not only to distressed inner cities, but also to many 
parts of rural America that suffer from "the decline of 
manufacturing and farm consolidation."308 However, "while lots 
of struggling residents see leaving as the best way to improve 
their lives, a surprising share remain stuck in place" because of 
high home prices in prosperous cities, reliance on locally-based 
social service networks and benefits, and cultural dissonance, 
so that "they no longer believe they can leave."309 
Davidson asserts that the Manichean nature of the "people 
or places" debate presents an "unnecessary distraction," and 
that "[e]very policy that seeks to alleviate individual poverty is 
constrained by location and, if successful, alters communities. 
Every policy that seeks to respond to the spatial concentration 
of poverty works through individuals."310 
From the perspective of Progressive Property, Professo.r 
Ezra Rosser stated that "targeted interventions in the ordinary 
workings of property law can be used to protect vulnerable 
populations by changing the power dynamics of the market," 
and discussed strategies for doing so for people in a 
"geographically defined space" (place-based) and "to particular 
parties who have shared characteristics" (people-based), and 
also a blend of strategies designed to achieve law reform. 311 
Some question the advantages of infrastructure 
expenditures in lagging communities. In discussing the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the land use economist 
306. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and 
Community Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1 n.1 (2009) (citing 
articles taking both positions). See also infra Part VI.B. 
307. Davidson, supra note 306, at 1. 
308. Janet Adamy & Paul Overberg, Struggling Americans Once 




310. Davidson, supra note 306, at 6. 
311. Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 455--56 (2015). 
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Edward Glaeser asked whether New Orleans residents would 
be better off having $200,000 in their pockets or $200 billion 
spent on city infrastructure, which would be unlikely to revive 
its economy in any event. 312 He added that "there is a 
big difference between rebuilding lives and rebuilding 
communities. Given limited funds, the two objectives may well 
conflict, and the usual lesson from economics is that people are 
better off if they are given money and allowed to make their 
own decisions, much as they are with car insurance."313 
In what might spark renewed interest in the "people or 
places" debate, President Trump recently declared that "[w]hen 
you have an area that just isn't working like upper New York 
state ... you can leave, it's OK, don't worry about your 
house."314 Programs that offer extensive tax credits to 
companies creating jobs in upstate New York have been 
"pushed" by Gov. Andrew Cuomo, but "[these] measures have 
been criticized as "inefficient," and the state's population 
decreased by 2,000 in the year ending in 2016.315 
VI. TAKINGS AND EXACTIONS 
Until about the time of the Civil War, American courts 
regularly explained the power of eminent domain with 
reference to natural law principles. 316 John Locke provided the 
alternative explanation that, although the sovereign could not 
appropriate private property, the conveyance of property for 
public use could be done by the owner, or by the legislature 
through its power delegated by the owner.317 In the U.S., the 
Fifth Amendment provides, among other limitations on 
government power, "nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."318 This did not 
constitute a new power of the federal government, but rather a 
"tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private 
property for public use."319 In 1875, in Kohl v. United States, 320 
312. Edward L. Glaeser, Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans, 
or Just Give Residents Checks?, THE ECONOMISTS' VOICE (Sept. 2005), 
https://doi.org/10.2202/1553-3832. l 12 l. 
313. Id at 2. 
314. Mike Vilensky, Trump Remark Stings Upstate New York, Sparks Debate, 
WALL ST. J., July 28, 2017, at A9A. 
315. Id. 
316. See J.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent 
Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67 (1931). 
317. Locke, supra note 7, § 138. 
318. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
319. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946). 
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the Supreme Court declared that the eminent domain power "is 
essential to [the U.S. government's] independent existence and 
perpetuity."321 Four years earlier, the Court made clear that 
the duty to compensate did not require an affirmative 
government appropriation of title, but could result from the 
government's actions, such as the authorization of a dam that 
would permanently flood private land upstream.322 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. u. Mahon, 323 Justice Holmes 
famously declared: "The general rule at least is that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."324 There, a state 
law had forbidden the company to mine seams of coal which 
would provide support for private structures, although earlier 
Mahon had purchased only surface rights and not the right of 
support. 325 Holmes opinion is very cryptic, and is not explicitly 
based either on the Takings Clause or on the company's right 
to due process of law. 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. u. City of New York, 326 
the Supreme Court's most important regulatory takings case, it 
evaluated a New York City historic preservation ordinance that 
precluded the railroad from constructing an office building on 
top of the architecturally acclaimed Grand Central Terminal. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, observed that defining 
a taking "has proved to be a problem of considerable 
difficulty."327 He declared: 
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop 
any "set formula" for determining when "justice and 
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than 
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few 
persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that 
whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid 
by the government's failure to pay for any losses 
320. 91 U.S. 367 (1875). 
321. Id. at 371. 
322. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (private land permanently 
flooded in course of building government-authorized dam). 
323. 260 U. S. 393 (1922). 
324. Id. at 415. 
325. Id. 
326. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
327. Id. at 123. 
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proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the 
particular circumstances [in that] case."328 
Justice Brennan then added what has become known329 as 
the three-factor Penn Central ad hoc balancing test: 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries, the Court's decisions have identified several 
factors that have particular significance. [1] The 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, [2] the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations 
are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is [3] the 
character of the governmental action. A "taking" may 
more readily be found when the interference with 
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good. 330 
Since interference with "expectations" is a subset of "economic 
impact," and since the Court's enumeration is only of factors 
having "particular significance," there is no clear reason why a 
three-factor analysis was employed.331 In any event, there is 
nothing talismanic about having three factors. 332 
Later, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church,333 
the Court added that a temporary regulation might 
require compensation in an appropriate case, a proposition it 
elaborated upon in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.334 There it declared that "we 
do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction 
precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize 
that it should not be given exclusive significance one way or the 
328. Id. at 124 (citation omitted). 
329. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 546 (discussing an earlier holding 
in which the Court had "applied the three-factor regulatory takings analysis set forth 
in Penn Central''). 
330. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted). 
331. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L. 
REV. 649, 655 (2012) ("[T]he intellectual fashions of the day demanded three- and four-
part tests."). 
332. See Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 
118 PA. ST. L. REV. 601, 615--16 (2014) (discussing other enumerative schemes). 
333. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
334. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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other."335 The Court declared as well that Penn Central 
remained its "polestar" in regulatory takings cases.336 
As I have elaborated upon elsewhere, the Penn Central 
doctrine has two principal flaws. First, although conventionally 
described as a three-factor test, as the brackets above indicate, 
the duration of a regulation is just as important a factor as the 
others. 337 Also the Penn Central doctrine "has become a 
compilation of moving parts that are neither individually 
coherent nor collectively compatible."338 As Professor Gideon 
Kanner added: "The vagueness and unpredictability of [Penn 
Central's] rules, or more accurately the 'factors' deemed 
significant by the Court which declined to formulate rules, 
have encouraged regulators to pursue policies that have 
sharply reduced the supply of housing and are implicated in 
the ongoing, mind-boggling escalation in home prices."339 That 
said, some have found a virtue in Penn Central's vagueness.340 
Second, while the mechanics of Penn Central are ungainly, 
the more fundamental problem is that it purports to be based 
on the Takings Clause, whereas it fits better under the 
rubric of substantive due process. 341 "Takings" refers to the 
government's appropriation of property, for which the owner is 
entitled to just compensation. "Burdens," on the other hand, 
refers to the owner's deprivation, relative to the owner's overall 
wealth. "Investment-backed expectations" even more explicitly 
is concerned with the owner and not with the asset. 342 
Armstrong, upon which Penn Central is predicated, states that 
"justice and fairness" abjure disproportionate burdens of 
government actions being placed on a few individuals. 343 
335. Id. at 337. 
336. Id. at 336. 
337. See Eagle, supra note 332. 
338. Id. at 602. 
339. Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS J. 679, 681 (2005) 
340. E.g., Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002). 
341. See Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 1 (2014); see also, Kenneth Salzberg, "Takings" as Due Process, or Due Process as 
"Takings''?, 36 VALPARAISO U. L. R. 413 (2002) (Advocating use of due process analysis 
in reviewing land use regulations); Peter A. Clodfelter & Edward J. Sullivan, 
Substantive Due Process Through the Just Compensation Clause: Understanding 
Koontz's "Special Application" of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions by 
Tracing the Doctrine's History, 46 URB. LAW. 569, 616--19 (2014) (asserting that Koontz 
engages in a heightened substantive due process style of judicial review under the 
guise of takings jurisprudence). 
342. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
343. Id. at 123--24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
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Pennsylvania Coal itself is much better viewed as a due 
process case than as a takings case.344 However, the Court's 
conservative justices have been unwilling to look at 
deprivations of land use through what they have regarded as 
an unconstrained lens, 345 and its progressive justices have 
viewed it in terms of the Court's pre-New Deal emphasis on 
property and contract rights. 346 Takings law ought to refer to 
the property taken, and not to, as Penn Central had it, the 
"economic impact" upon the particular owner of that property, 
nor that person's "expectations," nor the "character" of the 
government's action (apart from whether it was arbitrary or 
not for a public use).347 
In practice, the Penn Central ad hoc, multi-factor balancing 
test has not proved auspicious for property owners. For 
instance, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which has 
jurisdiction over takings claims against the federal 
government, "generally has relied on value losses 'well in 
excess of 85 percent' in finding takings."348 As Professor Joseph 
Singer notes, "It turns out that it is really hard to win a 
regulatory takings claim."349 
Penn Central's lack of definitiveness, together with the 
flight from meaningful long-term planning,350 seems suited to 
produce a reign of bargaining and delay and an invitation to 
arbitrary conduct, which fulfills neither adherence to the rule 
of law nor the goal of an adequate supply of housing. 
A. New Flavors of "Takings" 
A permanent appropriation of private land for government 
use, deemed a "physical taking," requires just compensation.351 
Likewise, restrictions on property that have the effect of 
344. Eagle, supra note 341, at 25-27. 
345. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (describing substantive due process as an "oxymoron"). 
346. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406-07 (1994) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (warning that due process-based compensation for takings of property had 
an "obvious kinship" with Lochnerism). 
347. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
348. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOL. L.Q. 
307, 335 (2007) (quoting Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 357 & n.32 (2006) 
(collecting cases)). 
349. Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 4 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
601, 606 (2015). 
350. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
351. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35 (1982) 
(real property); Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S.Ct. 2419, 2426-27 (2015) (personal 
property). 
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"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole" 
may be deemed "regulatory takings" under Penn Central's 
multi-factor, ad hoc, balancing test. 352 Restrictions that deprive 
an owner of all economically viable use of land constitute 
categorical regulatory takings since they do not require the 
application of a balancing test.353 
In addition to these familiar, judicially established 
categories of compensable takings, new varieties have been 
proposed. Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky 
have argued that physical and regulatory takings should be 
augmented by the category of "derivative takings,"354 by which 
they define as "a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins" 
that occurs when a taking "diminishes the value of surrounding 
property."355 More recently, Bell and Parchomovsky have 
proposed study of what might be styled a "Givings Clause."356 
Under this rubric, parallel to their three categories of takings, 
would be physical, regulatory, and derivative "givings." Those 
might require compensation be paid from the recipient to the 
government. 357 
Justice Elena Kagan's dissenting opinion in Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District articulated fears that 
increased Takings Clause liability would lead local 
governments to grant development approvals that would create 
negative externalities for the community. 358 In that event, 
Professor Gregory Stein recently postulated, members of the 
public should be able to sue for a "reverse exaction."359 While 
this kind of citizen lawsuit might be effective with respect to 
352. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (1978) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
353. See Lucas v. S.C .. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
354. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 
277 (2001). 
355. Id. at 280-81. Derivative takings: 
resemble regulatory takings in that they reduce the value of property without 
physically appropriating it. Yet, they are distinct from regulatory takings in 
that they may arise as the result of a physical taking. And, unlike its cousins, 
the derivative taking never appears alone; it must always be preceded by a 
physical or regulatory taking. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
356. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001). 
357. Id. at 564-7 4 (setting forth their taxonomy). 
358. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority "casts a cloud on every decision by 
every local government to require a person seeking a permit to pay or spend money"). 
359. Stein, supra note 136. 
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egregious cases of cronyism or outright corruption, the overall 
effect might be to empower local NIMBYs who simply do not 
want change nearby. 
B. Contemporary Takings Issues 
1. Varied Views of Regulatory Takings 
Professor Christopher Serkin recently advocated that the 
Takings Clause does not merely provide property owners with 
negative rights, but rather might be the basis for compensation 
where government fails its affirmative duty to protect property, 
perhaps for permitting "passive takings" with respect to sea 
level rise. 360 
On the other hand, Professor Hanoch Dagan asserted that 
the "broad consensus" that the taking of private property 
generally deserves compensation does not apply to regulatory 
takings law.361 There, "some progressive authors advocate a 
regime that sanctions, indeed expects, significant c1v1c 
sacrifices extending to all economically beneficial uses of one's 
land. These authors perceive most government injuries to 
private property as ordinary examples of the background risks 
and opportunities assumed by property owners."362 
2. Simple Disregard of Property Rights 
Sometimes, the intent of administrators and court seems to 
be that state governments can reconfigure infrastructure more 
inexpensively by disregarding property rights. A recent 
example is Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Mississippi 
Transportation Commission. 363 There, the state supreme court 
upheld the commission's determination that condemned land 
should be valued as if it were subject to an apparently 
abandoned highway easement, on the ground that state law 
gave the highway department the power to prevent legal 
360. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to Protect 
Property, 113 MICH. L REV. 345 (2014). 
361. Hanoch Dagan, Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings: Towards a Unified 
Theory *4 (Oct. 31, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2861844. 
362. Id. (footnote omitted). 
363. 201 So.3d 1046 (Miss. 2016), petition for cert. docketed, Mar. 7, 2017, 
No. 16-1077. 
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abandonment as a matter of law. The dissenting justices 
argued that this would violate the owner's right to just 
compensation.364 
3. Government Takings of Less (Or More) than the 
"Whole Parcel" 
The archetypical takings case involves a parcel of land 
appropriated by the government. Thus, common law property 
and equity establish relationships of land to land, without any 
need to focus on the identity of the individuals involved. 365 
However, especially in government infrastructure projects such 
as highway construction, less than a given owner's entire 
parcel is taken, and condemnation might have significant 
impacts on adjoining owners, as well. 
Professors Bell and Parchomovsky recently have argued 
that the practical difficulties in dealing with the burdens and 
benefits of severance should lead to the affected owner having 
the right to demand that the government entity engaging in an 
"incomplete taking" be forced to acquire the owner's fee simple, 
instead. 366 While good intentions lead to "severance damages" 
when partial takings reduce the value of parts of the owner's 
parcel that were not taken, a countervailing concern is the 
benefits the owner derives from the project for which land is 
taken, which might inure particularly to the owner ("special 
benefits") or to the area generally. States have attempted to 
take these factors into account in differing ways. 367 
Another practical problem that affects land development 
involves the "relevant parcel" with regard to which the 
relationship between lot size and development rights, and also 
government takings liability, is to be measured. In Penn 
Central, the Supreme Court stated that: "In deciding whether a 
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this 
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on 
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the 
parcel as a whole .... "368 Unfortunately, there is no definitive 
364. See id. at 1059-160 (Kitchens, J., dissenting). 
365. See Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the 
Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 559 (2012). 
366. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Incomplete Takings, COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
367. See generally NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A.03 (3d ed. 2015) 
(summarizing the different state and federal approaches to offsets). 
368. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
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answer as to how the "relevant parcel" is determined.369 The 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin370 held 
that reasonable investment-backed expectations should be 
taken into account in determining the relevant parcel to which 
it and the other Penn Central factors should be applied. 371 The 
principal dissent, by Chief Justice Roberts, stressed that "in all 
but the most exceptional circumstances," the boundaries of 
deeded parcels should "determine the parcel at issue," and that 
"[c]ramming [the Penn Central factors] into the definition of 
'private property' undermines the effectiveness of the Takings 
Clause as a check on the government's power to shift the cost of 
public life onto private individuals."372 A separate dissent by 
Justice Thomas emphasized that the Takings Clause was not 
deemed to encompass "regulatory takings" before Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon in 1922, and that "it would be desirable for 
us to take a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence, 
to see whether it can be grounded in the original public 
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."373 
VII. REGULATION, HOUSING PRICES, AND PROSPERITY 
A. Regulation and High Housing Prices 
A classic example of good intentions producing bad results 
is the tendency of regulations promulgated to provide better 
housing instead resulting in less housing and less affordability. 
California, particularly in its coastal cities, is facing a housing 
affordability crisis. "Median rents across the state have 
increased 24 percent since 2000, while at the same time 
median renter household incomes have declined 7 percent."374 
While these rising rents result from a number of factors: 
369. See generally Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 353 (2003). 
370. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (considering whether the statutory merger of two 
contiguous parcels under the same ownership constituted a regulatory taking). 
371. Id. at 1945, 1949. 
372. Id. at 1953-54 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Thomas and Alito, JJ.). 
373. Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415 (1922)). 
374. Cal. Rous. P'ship Corp., Confronting California's Rent and Poverty Crisis: 
A Call for State Reinvestment in Affordable Homes, (2016), https://www.issuelab.org/ 
resource/confronting-california-s-rent-and-poverty-crisis-a-call-for-state-reinvestment-
in-affordable-homes.html. 
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[I]t is clear that supply matters, and there is an urgent 
need to expand supply in equitable and environmentally 
sustainable ways. Over the past three decades, 
California has added only about half the number of 
units it needs to keep housing costs in line with the rest 
of the United States. 375 
Overly stringent land use regulations account for much of this 
problem.376 
B. Residential Mobility and National Prosperity 
The issue of whether government should provide benefits to 
people or places, discussed earlier, 377 has broad implications for 
regional and national prosperity. From a macroeconomics 
perspective, Professor David Schleicher recently has asserted 
that people are "stuck" in place because state and local 
governments have created a "huge number of legal barriers to 
inter-state mobility," including land use laws, differing 
homeownership subsidies, and differing eligibility standards 
for public benefits. 378 Those collectively limit exit areas with 
less opportunity. He added that "public policies developed by 
state and local governments more interested in local 
population stability than in ensuring successful macroeconomic 
conditions."379 
Those concerns are very much in line with the recent work 
of economists Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, who point 
out that regional and national prosperity is enhanced by 
workers moving to areas where agglomeration would facilitate 
their higher productivity. 380 However, they might be 
discouraged from doing so, because the lower pay in cities 
where they would add less value to the economy would be more 
than offset by the lower housing prices there. 381 
375. Carolina K. Reid et al., Addressing California's Housing Slwrtage: Lessons 
from Massachusetts Chapter 40B, 25 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 241, 241 
(2017) (footnote omitted). 
376. See Edward Glaeser, Land Use Restrictions and Other Barriers to 
Growth, CATO INST. (2014), https://www.cato.org/publications/cato-online-forum/land-
use-restrictions-other-barriers-growth. 
377. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
378. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stability, 
127 YALE L.J. *l(forthcoming). 
379. Id. at *l. 
380. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial 
Misallocation, (May 18, 2017), http://eml.berkeley.edu//-moretti/growth.pdf. 
381. Id. at 1-3. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The law of land use planning is marked with good 
intentions, from the faith of the original Progressives in 
objective and expert administration, through landowner-
centered wariness of regulation of supporters of property 
rights, to the social-democratic views of the Progressive 
Property advocates. Yet none have created a substantive 
framework for regulation that receives general acclaim or even 
general support. Economic prosperity brings dislocation and 
inequality. Preserving community inherently is unwelcoming 
to substantial numbers of outsiders. Affordable housing is fine 
in the abstract, but different socio-economic groups have very 
different understandings of how it should work and whom it 
should benefit. 
Likewise, legal mechanisms for policing the boundary 
between private property rights and permissible government 
regulation, most notably the Supreme Court's Penn Central 
doctrine, largely leave public officials and judges to their own 
devices. In the absence of any unifying v1s10n, the 
particularities of time and place transcend earlier notions of 
expert long-term planning. Local officials often have imposed 
ponderous regulatory schemes that inhibit the production of 
housing and sometimes try to leverage the police power 
through public-private partnerships that are apt to benefit 
private participants more than the public. 
The American public generally has good intentions, but in 
the absence of serious debate that might lead to the formation 
of coherent aspirations and goals based on the discrete needs of 
various segments of the population and also of places, land use 
regulation cannot be do other than reflect disarray. 
